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THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Frans G. von der Dunk * and Peter H. Kooijmans ** 
The process of German unification, at least as far as its interna- 
tional legal aspects are concerned, is almost complete now.' After the 
first Staat~vertrag,~ creating as of July 1, 1990, a monetary union be- 
tween the Federal Republic of Germany ("FRG") and the German 
Democratic Republic ("GDR"), the second Staatsvertrag uniting the 
two States as of October 3 legally sealed the inter-German aspects of 
the unification. 
At the same time, the September 12 Treaty4 between the four for- 
mer occupation powers - the United States, the Soviet Union, Great 
Britain and France - and the two former occupied German States 
took care of the remaining international aspects, along with the Treaty 
of Friendship between the FRG and the Soviet UnionS and the Ger- 
man-Polish Treaty6 on boundaries and friendly relations. 
Then on December 2, the first all-German free elections were held 
Assistant Professor of Public International Law, Leiden University. 
** Professor of Public International Law, Leiden University. 
1. For a summary of relevant events, see the various Zeittafel in 44 EUROPA ARCHIV (1989) 
and 45 EUROPA ARCHIV (1990). 
2. Treaty Establishing a Monetary, Economic and Social Union, May 18, 1990, FRG-GDR, 
BULLETIN (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung) Nr. 63/S. 517 (1990) [hereinafter 
First State Treaty], reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1108 (1990) (entered into force July 1, 1990). 
3. Treaty on the Unification of Germany, Aug. 31, 1990, BULLETIN (Presse- und Informa- 
tionsamt der Bundesregierung) Nr. 104/S. 877 (1990) [hereinafter Second State Treaty], re- 
printed in 30 I.L.M. 457 (1991) (entered into force October 3, 1990). 
4. Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, BULLETIN 
(Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung) Nr. 109/S. 1153 (1990) [hereinafter Two 
Plus Four Treaty], reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1186 (1990). This treaty became final on March 4, 
1991, when the Soviet Union, as the last of the signatories, ratified the treaty. See NRC 
Handelsblad, Mar. 5, 1991, at 7, col. 1. But at any rate, the object and purpose would have stood 
after the conclusion of those treaties last fall. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 
18, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980 [here- 
inafter Vienna Convention], reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 686 (1969). This article obliges a State not 
to defeat the "object and purpose of a treaty," prior to its entry into force, once it has signed such 
a treaty. 
5. Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations, Partnership and Cooperation, Nov. 9, 1990, 
FRG-USSR, reprinted in Die Welt, Sept. 18, 1990, at 8, col. 1; also reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 504 
(1991). 
6. Treaty on Boundaries and Friendly Relations, Nov. 14, 1990, Germany-Poland, NRC 
Handelsblad, Nov. 14, 1990, at 11, col. 1. 
Published in MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (Spring 1991), pp. 510-557.
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in realization of a much disputed article of the FRG's Constit~tion.~ 
The results confirmed in large measure the consent of the German 
people to the fact and modalities of unification. Now all that remains 
is the possibility of a referendum, to be held in the next few years, 
which could result in a new Constitution. Such a Constitution might 
lead to the replacement of the FRG, for all practical purposes, by a 
new state "Germany" - or "United Germany" or "United Federa- 
tion of Germany" or whatever name would be given to the newly 
united States. 
Does this mean, however, that the unification of Germany has 
taken place regardless of international law? The process, of course, 
had many important aspects unrelated to international law; however, 
the questions to be examined here are: What exactly were the interna- 
tional legal parameters of the unification process, and to what extent 
have they been acknowledged and incorporated into the legal instru- 
ments effecting the unification? 
It seems that in situations of an extremely political character, such 
as the one concerning the (re)unification* of Germany, public interna- 
tional law cannot provide one final, simple solution. International law 
is essentially a jus dispositivum: States can only be bound if they so 
choose or have so chosen in the past. If, however, only explicit choices 
were considered to have binding effect in international law, too many 
gaps would exist to make it a useful system; acquiescence thus plays a 
prominent role. Furthermore, building upon acquiescence, cases of es- 
toppel' or preclusion may sometimes arise.g 
With regard to the question of German unification, therefore, pub- 
lic international law could only provide the legal framework within 
which States had the freedom to opt for the various choices available 
to them; nevertheless, acting within this framework was a legal duty 
for all States concerned. 
The principles of sovereignty and freedom of States, however, can 
go even further. By acting unanimously, affected States may set aside 
rules of international law (be they in the form of treaties or customary 
law), so long as no right of another State is infringed nor any peremp- 
tory norm of international law vio1ated;lO this is the essence of the 
- - -- 
7. Article 146, to be discussed infm Section 111. 
8. It is an interesting but rather straightforward question whether "unification" or "reunifi- 
cation" is the proper term for this coming together. Since the Eastern Temtories were necessar- 
ily excluded from this unit (see infra Section 11), a reunification of Germany encompassing its 
entire 1937 territory was impossible; thus, "unification" is the applicable term. 
9. See, e.g., Bowett, Estoppel before International Tribunals and Its Rehtion to Acquiescence, 
33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 176 (1957). 
10. See Vienna Convention, supm note 4, at arts. 43, 54(b). 
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notion of jus dispositivum. This means that if all parties with rights 
and obligations concerning the German unification - the four occu- 
pation powers, the two Germanies, the nine remaining Member States 
of the European Communities ("EC"), the EC themselves insofar as 
they can act as a subject of international law, and possibly others - 
were in 'agreement concerning the means, the modalities and all the 
implications of the realization of such unification, then they could set 
aside the existing legal framework. If this were to occur, these parties 
would, by their very acts, create a new legal framework. Such a course 
would not enhance the autonomous value of international law and the 
role it plays in politics, but it would be interesting to analyze the result 
as a new piece of law. Either way, an analysis of the international 
legal ramifications of a unified Germany will reveal ramifications be- 
yond the more narrow issue. 
As to the actual issue of unification, only if one of the parties men- 
tioned had wished to postpone, modify or prevent a certain form of 
unification, contrary to the desires of other parties, would the existing 
international legal rights and obligations really have come into play. 
What role these rights and obligations could have played is there- 
fore the central theme of this article. However, in view of the enor- 
mous complexity of the problems involved, this article can do no more 
than provide a general overview. Sections I1 through VII will first 
sketch the outlines of the rights and obligations confronting the two 
German States before unification. Section VIII will compare those 
outlines to the actual political outcome of the unification process. The 
former six Sections will explore a number of different contexts in 
which legal rights and obligations could have been found. 
The first context, discussed in Section 11, concerns the power of the 
four victors of 1945 over the two German States as a consequence of, 
inter alia, the absence of a peace treaty. 
The second context, discussed in Section 111, is that of the relation- 
ship between the two German States inter se, which until very recently 
still consisted of confrontation with each other over the heritage of the 
war. This confrontation was legally entrenched in their Basic Laws 
and their claims with regard to each other, especially the claims of the 
FRG with regard to the GDR. And in this situation legal principles 
such as acquiescence and estoppel are relevant. 
The third context, discussed in Section IV, is the incorporation of 
the two German States in the military blocs formed around the United 
States and the Soviet Union: NATO and the Warsaw Pact, respec- 
tively. Because of its close relationship with NATO, the role of the 
Western European Union will also be dealt with in this context. 
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Section V addresses the fourth context, that of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE") and its aftermath, 
through the adoption of the Charter of Paris in November, 1990. Es- 
pecially relevant here, of course, is the Final Act of Helsinki, 1975." 
The fifth context, discussed in Section VI, is that of the European 
Communities, which have supranational powers in various fields and 
are on their way to further political integration, with the FRG as one 
of their most powerful and prominent members. It is especially neces- 
sary in this respect to investigate in what way unilateral West German 
actions could have affected the rights and duties of the other EC Mem- 
ber States or the EC as a whole. 
As a sixth point of interest, the intricate legal ramifications of Ber- 
lin as an occupied and divided city will briefly be sketched, in Section 
VII, in their relation to the unification problem. 
Finally, in Section VIII, the outlines of legal rights and obligations 
in these contexts will be compared to the actual political outcome. 
This analysis will provide a conclusion about the political relevance of 
international law in the unification of Germany: Was the unification 
an example of political factors overriding existing legal ones - an ex- 
ample which would detract from the general value of international 
law, while simultaneously creating new law - or was it, from the 
international law viewpoint, an auspicious beginning for a new State 
because its creation adhered to the existing legal framework (instead of 
creating a new one), thereby contributing to the strength thereof? 
Through this analysis, a preliminary answer may be formulated to the 
question: Can Deutschland Einig Vaterland (Germany, The Sole Fa- 
therland) be regarded favorably from an international legal point of 
view, or does it present reasons to revive old fears? Did unification 
actually take place ~ b e r  Alles, regardless of everything else? 
11. THE TWO GERMANIES AND THE FOUR OCCUPATION POWERS 
When Germany surrendered unconditionally in the summer of 
1945 to the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, 
these three victors - later accompanied by France - together in- 
stalled an occupation regime which was intended to last only until a 
peace treaty would define the final status and form post-war Germany 
would take.12 One of the most prominent features expected of such a 
11. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, re- 
printed in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975). 
12. See Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Au- 
thority with Respect to Germany, June 5, 1945, 60 Stat. 1649, T.I.A.S. No. 1520, 68 U.N.T.S. 
189, reprinted in 39 AM. J .  INT'L L. 171 (Supp 1945); Protocol of Proceedings of the Berlin 
(Potsdam) Conference of the Three Heads of Government of the United States, the Soviet Union 
5 14 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 12:510 
peace treaty was the final determination of the Western frontier of Po- 
land. In Potsdam it was decided that such a peace settlement should 
be prepared "to be accepted by the Government of Germany."13 
Due to the Cold War, in the years after 1945 the four occupation 
zones - originally intended as an interim solution to the problem of 
occupation pending final settlement - grew into what was to become 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Re- 
public, both created in 1949. Neither of the two, however, immedi- 
ately amved at sovereign statehood. The three Western allies in the 
FRG, and the Soviet Union in the GDR, maintained their essential 
rights arising out of the occupation, which had not yet been formally 
ended. 
For the FRG, this situation was not modified by the formal Procla- 
mation on the Termination of the State of War with Germany by U.S. 
President Truman, on October 24, 1951, since the Proclamation made 
clear by its own terms that it was not a peace treaty.14 However, the 
1952/54 Convention on Germany,15 which in article l(2) granted the 
FRG sovereignty,16 did to a certain extent modify the situation. For 
example, from that time onward the three Western allies were repre- 
sented in the FRG by Ambassadors instead of High Comrni~sioners.~~ 
However, some residual occupationary rights, namely the right to 
station troops in West German territory, were reserved in article 4 
together with article 2, and were in fact still utilized until unification. 
This situation did not change substantially with the Emergency Law,18 
which came into force on June 25, 1968, and referred to article 5(2) of 
and the United Kingdom, Aug. 2, 1945 [hereinafter Potsdam Protocol], reprinted in Docu- 
MENTS ON BERLIN 1943-1963, at 15 (W. Heidelmeyer & G. Hindrichs rev. 2d ed. 1963). For the 
texts of these documents, and in general for all documents concerning the German question, see 
E. ZIVIER, DER R E C H ~ A T U S  DES LANDES BERLIN (3d ed. 1977); I. HENDRY & M. WOOD, 
THE LEGAL STATUS OF BERLIN (1987); I. VON MUNCH, 1 OS~ERTRAGE (1971). 
13. Potsdam Protocol, supm note 12, at 8 I(3)(i). 
14. 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 12 (Supp. 1952). 
15. Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, May 26, 1952 (as amended on Oct. 23, 1954), 331 U.N.T.S. 327 [hereinafter Convention 
on Germany] (also known as Deutschlandvertrog). 
16. Article l(2) stated that the FRG should have the "full authority of a sovereign State over 
its internal and external affairs." 331 U.N.T.S. at 328. But see Piotrowicz, The Status of Ger- 
many in International Law: Deutschland Uber Deutschlond?, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 609, 615 
(1989). 
17. E. ZIVIER, supra note 12, at 32. 
18. Emergency Law ("Notstandsverfassung"), June 24, 1968, reprinted in Holderbaum, 
Volkerrechtliche Praxis der Bundesrepublik Deutschlond in den Jahren 1967 und 1968, 30 ZEIT- 
SCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND V~LKERRECHT 650, 694-701 
(1970) (promulgated by the West German parliament to substitute allied rights regarding the 
security of allied forces in the FRG, as contained in article 5(2)). 
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the Convention on Germany.19 In fact, the Western allies continued 
to reserve their rights as to Germany as a whole, for example, in the 
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin of 1971;20 and their acquiescence 
to the Emergency Law was necessary, since they could not be bound 
by federal laws of West Germany. The consent to the Emergency Law 
expressed in the Note of the three Western allies of December 13, 
1967, was given only with regard to "the protection of the security of 
armed forces stationed in the Federal Republic," not with regard to 
"the stationing of armed forces," the right to which remained reserved 
under article 4(1).z1 Thus, no acquiescence in the FRG's efforts to- 
ward unity existed to estop the Western allies from demanding certain 
conditions regarding the stationing of troops,22 conditions making the 
FRG slightly less than fully sovereign. 
For the GDR, the Statement of 195423 and the 1955 Treaty with 
the Soviet Union24 provided for essentially the same measure of sover- 
eignty when compared with the FRG. This time, however, the 
residual occupationary rights to station troops became Soviet rights 
under the bilateral treaty of 1955.25 Although the USSR reserved the 
rights and obligations which stemmed from the existing agreements of 
the four powers concerning Germany as a whole, in view of the above 
this must be taken to apply no longer to the occupation as such, but, as 
was repeatedly stated, only to the final peace settlement. 
The situation was complicated to some extent by the Decree of the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of January 25, 1955, preceding the 
1955 Treaty and declaring the "[elnding [of] the State of War between 
the USSR and Germany." It was a phenomenon sui generis: a kind of 
peace "treaty" unilaterally declared by the Soviet Union as a substi- 
tute for a general peace treaty. Because of 'protests by the Western 
allies, this Decree could not create binding restrictions upon them 
19. Article 5(2) refers to the security of Allied forces in the FRG, not to their presence as 
such. See Convention on Germany, supra note 15. 
20. See infm note 147 and accompanying text. 
21. See Holderbaum, supm note 18, at 696-700; Convention on Germany, supra note 15, at 
art. q1).  See also Notification of the Declaration of the Three Powers, May 27, 1968, reprinted 
in 2 SARTORIUS, DOC. NO. 604 (1988) (concerning the renunciation of the reserved rights of the 
allies in accordance with article 5(2) of the Convention on Germany). 
22. See Piotrowicz, supra note 16, at 616-18. 
23. Statement by the Government of the Soviet Union on the Relations between the Soviet 
Union and the GDR, Mar. 25, 1954, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON BERLIN 1943-1963, supra note 
12, at 166. Two days later, this situation was acknowledged by the GDR. Statement by the 
Government of the DDR on their Sovereignty, Mar. 27, 1954, reprinted in id. at 167. 
24. Treaty concerning Relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the 
German Democratic Republic, Sept. 20, 1955, 226 U.N.T.S. 208 [hereinafter 1955 Treaty]. 
25. Article 4 states that Soviet forces "will remain for the time being in the German Demo- 
cratic Republic agreement, with the agreement of its government." Id. at art. 4. 
5 16 Michigan Journal of International Law p o l .  12:510 
with regard to any future peace treaty; however, the Soviets' intent to 
consider the occupation regime ended coincided with the situation 
which resulted from the 1955 Treaty. 
The legal situation before unification therefore seemed to be that 
the three Western occupying allies, by reserving some occupationary 
rights up until unification occurred, still retained their rights regarding 
the FRG and any peace treaty with Germany.26 Repeated pledges by 
the three Western occupiers toward peaceful (re)unification2' and 
their acquiescence in German sovereignty, however, left them little 
leeway in their options concerning unification. The most important 
caveat that they could have put forward was that such peaceful unifi- 
cation could only take place within the borders of the FRG and GDR; 
the possibility of allowing for claims concerning the Eastern Territo- 
ries (Ostgebiete) had been taken away by legal obligations emanating 
from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Hel- 
sinki Final Act and the international obligations contained therein,28 
and even more by the nemo plus rule,29 making it impossible for the 
Western allies to give away more than they themselves had, i.e., the 
competence to decide as to the Eastern Territories. Indeed, the West- 
ern occupying allies always took the position that they were not able 
to decide on inclusion of the Eastern Territories in a united Germany 
without agreement on the part of the Soviet Union; article 7(1)30 of the 
Convention on Germany is but one example of this recognition. That 
decision was (and is) beyond the competence of the allies because even 
if the original annexation by the Soviet Union and, especially, by Po- 
land - not a victor in the war against Germany, legally speaking - of 
those territories had been considered illegal at the time under contem- 
porary international law, such illegality would have been taken away 
by prescription,3l since no Western State could claim not to have ac- 
quiesced since the 1970s. 
As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, because its occupation- 
26. See Convention on Germany, supm note 15, at art. 2. 
27. E.g., id. at art. 7. 
28. See infro Section V. 
29. Nemo plus juris 0s olium tmnsferre porest quom ipse hobet. "No one can transfer more 
right to another than he has himself." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed.) 1038 (1990). 
30. Convention on Germany, supm note 15, at art. 7 (stating, inter olio, that the borders of a 
united Germany could only become final after a peace agreement between such a Germany and 
its former enemies had been signed; consent of the latter, including the USSR, was therefore 
imperative). 
31. Le., the "hardening" of an originally illegal occupation into a de facto irreversible one, 
and, when accompanied by acquiescence to this fact, thus a lawful one. See, e.g., Island of Pal- 
mas Case, 1928 UNRIAA 829, 868; Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. 116, 130 
(Judgment of Dec. 18); Bowett, supm note 9, at 200-01 (on the intricate relationship between 
estoppel, prescription . . . and acquiescence). 
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ary rights in the GDR were transformed into rights based on a treaty 
with a sovereign equal in 1955,32 those rights were no longer maintain- 
able against the wishes of the GDR (within the rules of the treaty 
concerning renunciation or modification, of course).3' The 1964 
Treaty with the Soviet Union34 was even more explicit, especially re- 
garding (re)unification. Not only the Soviet Union but also the GDR 
obligated itself in article 7 to refrain from striving for unification of a 
peaceful Germany except by means of an agreement between the two 
sovereign German States. In addition, article 1 obliged both signato- 
ries not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other. The Soviet 
Union was further bound, not only by its pledged support for a peace- 
ful united Germany,35 but also by those CSCE principles which con- 
tained legal  obligation^.^^ In total, this meant the Soviet Union had an 
obligation to refrain, inter alia, from taking any but a peaceful position 
toward an East German wish for unification. 
The questions, finally, of Soviet occupationary rights as against 
West Germany3' and of Western occupationary rights against East 
Germany, were without substance, since the two States were acknowl- 
edged to be sovereign States.in the early 1 9 7 0 ~ ~ ~  - acknowledged 
without any reservation which could have been invoked other than 
with respect to a peace treaty or by means of general reservations ema- 
nating from international law, such as those mentioned above. 
Because of that acceptance of the existence of two German States 
on the territory of the former Reich, the German Reich - which did 
not disappear in 1945 and whose existence was never formally ended 
32. The Federal Social Court of the FRG acknowledged this in a judgment of November 6, 
1985, stating furthermore that the FRG had acquiesced in the GDR's new status by signing the 
Basic Treaty, infm note 49. 
33. See 1955 Treaty, supm note 24, at art. 6 (providing that the treaty was to "remain in 
force until Germany is reunited as a peaceful and democratic State, or until the Contracting 
Parties agree [otherwise]"). Even leaving aside questions concerning treaties imposed by force or 
threat, this clearly is a provision which could not prevent, if it did not indeed automatically lead 
to, renunciation of the treaty in case of a unification such as the one that has taken place. Specifi- 
cally with regard to options for unification, the sovereignty of the GDR was complete as long as 
the conditions contained in the treaty were fulfilled, and the Soviet Union's occupationary rights 
became void under the 1955 Treaty itself. 
34. Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation between the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the German Democratic Republic, June 12, 1964, 553 U.N.T.S. 249 
[hereinafter 1964 Treaty]. 
35. See, e.g., 1955 Treaty, supm note 24, at art. 5; Statement by the Government of the Soviet 
Union on the Relations between the Soviet Union and the DDR, supm note 23. 
36. See discussion infm Section V. 
37. See Arndt, Legal Problems of the German Eastern Treaties, 74 AM. J .  INT'L L. 122, 125 
(1980). 
38. Piotrowicz, supm note 16, at 629 (noting that all four occupying powers, having the right 
of veto in the Security Council, voted in favor of their admission to the United Nations). 
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by debellatio 39 - had finally to be deemed to have legally disappeared 
in its 1937 form. Following that disappearance, the notion of the 
Reich remained important only because of the reservations of certain 
occupationary rights40 by the three Western allies, and because of the 
reservation of rights as to a peace treaty by all four occupation pow- 
e r ~ . ~ '  Following the acquiescence in Polish and Soviet sovereignty 
over the former Eastern Terr i t~r ies ,~~ those reservations could only 
have become relevant with regard to the remainder of the Reich: 
namely, a Germany to come into being on a FRG+GDR-only 
formula. 
Hence, only after both sovereign German States, following free 
and democratic elections, had opted for unification, would those rights 
and obligations of the four former occupation powers exist and be- 
come relevant.43 This was acknowledged in an exchange of notes on 
the day of the conclusion of the Basic Treaty between the Ministers of 
the FRG and the GDR.44 
From all this, then, the conclusion must be: (1) By their pledges to 
a peaceful, democratic and free united Germany,45 the Western allies 
were estopped from trying to prevent such a union by demanding that 
an occupationary regime be included in any peace treaty. Thus, the 
Western allies were barred from using their reservations, made with 
regard to the FRG, to impede unification. (2) Because a true unifica- 
tion of the entire pre- 1937 Germany was out of the question, the rights 
of the four powers to a peace treaty pertained only to the Germany 
39. Le., a decision by victors in a war to end the state of occupation by ending the legal 
existence of a State, for example by formal annexation. See Piotrowicz, supm note 16, at 609-29; 
E. ZIVIER, supm note 12, at 137-39. 
40. See generally Letter from the Three High Commissioners to the Federal Chancellor Con- 
cerning the Exercise of the Reserved Rights Relating to Germany as a Whole, as amended by 
Letter No. X of Oct. 23, 1954, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON BERLIN 1943-63, supm note 12, at 
141; see also Convention on Germany, supra note 15, at art. 2. 
41. See Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Ending the State of War between the 
USSR and Germany, Jan. 25, 1955, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON BERLIN 1943-63, supm note 
12, at 141; 1964 Treaty, supm note 34, at art. 9. 
42. For the problems regarding the FRG Constitution, see infm Section 111. 
43. See Piotrowicz, supra note 16, at 631-35. The rights and obligations of the four powers 
were not addressed by the Basic Treaty. See Treaty on the Basis of Intra-German Relations, 
infm note 49, at art. 9. 
44. The Federal Minister for Special Affairs, Bahr, and the Secretary of State at the Council 
of Ministers, Kohl, respectively. See 2 SARTORIUS, DOC. NO. 500, at 10-11 (1988). See infm 
Section 111. 
45. E.g., Potsdam Protocol, supm note 12, at 15-23; Declaration on Berlin by the Three 
Foreign Ministers of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and France at London, 
May 12, 1950, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON BERLIN 1943-1963, supra note 12, at 118-19; Com- 
muniqut of the New York Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States of America, the 
United Kingdom, and France on the New Phase in the Relations between the Allies and the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Sept. 19, 1950, reprinted in id. at 78-79; Final Communiqut of the 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Dec. 19, 1957, reprinted in id. at 157. 
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which would result from the FDR + GDR joinder - and only to the 
extent that such a peace treaty had not already been preempted by 
factual developments. (3) The Western allies, however, indeed re- 
tained the right to demand that the two German States unequivocally 
recognize, in such a peace treaty, the Polish-German border as it ex- 
isted at unification. (4) Left open by this was the possibility of a treaty 
with the united Germany concerning the stationing of troops. 
As to the Soviet Union, it was not only estopped from trying to 
prevent unification by its pledge for a peaceful, democratic and free 
united Germany, but was also more or less obliged to actively further 
such unification by its Decree Ending the State of War and the terms 
of the 1955 and 1964 T r e a t i e ~ . ~ ~  Only after such a unification would 
the residual powers that existed with respect to the Reich of 1937 have 
been revived. Those residual powers revived would have included the 
right to conclude a peace treaty with the new Germany - that Ger- 
many not being territorially identical to the Reich. The most impor- 
tant feature of such a peace treaty in this respect would have been the 
confirmation of the finality of the loss of the Eastern Territories by and 
for the new German State. The Soviet Union, one of the victors over 
the old Germany, had derogated its rights to the Eastern Territories to 
Poland, and would have been thus obliged to uphold this confirmation 
in the process of concluding a peace treaty. 
The only demand, therefore, that could legally have been made 
regarding a united Germany by any of the four occupying powers was 
for a peace treaty - or a substituting document - with a guarantee of 
abstention from any claims to the Eastern Territories. Furthermore, 
as long as both Germanies acted in conformity with their own re- 
peated pledges (read: obligations) concerning the use of peaceful and 
democratic means, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other 
States, and other relevant rules of international law, the four powers 
would have been estopped from obstructing the formation of such a 
peaceful, free and democratic united Germany. The form, of the new 
Germany, i.e., the modalities of unification, would have made little 
difference in this respect. This also meant that a refusal - for exam- 
ple, by the Soviet Union - to ratify the Two Plus Four Treaty would 
not have detracted from these conclusions as to the lawfulness of Ger- 
man unification and the impossibility of legally obstructing it to any 
significant extent. 
46. See, e.g., 1955 Treaty, supra note 24, at art. 1; 1964 Treaty, supm note 34, at arts. 1, 7. 
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111. THE TWO GERMANIES, THEIR "DOMESTIC RIGHTS AND 
OBLIGATIONS" AND THIRD STATES 
Another question arose before unification: What were the legal po- 
sitions of the FRG and the GDR toward each other and toward unifi- 
cation, and what legal implications could these positions possibly have 
entailed on the international plane? 
The GDR in its Basic Law4' circumvented the question of a duty 
to strive for unification or, on the contrary, a duty to refrain there- 
from, after it created a GDR-nationality by a law of February 20, 
1967.48 By this action, it implicitly claimed to be a State in its own 
right; German indeed, but without any legal ties to the former Reich, 
and on this basis without any urge for (re)unilication. It even, in arti- 
cle 6(2), claimed to be "forever and irrevocably allied to the Soviet 
Union." 
Thereafter, the moment of truth for the GDR was the Basic 
Treaty49 with the FRG in 1972, which in the eyes of the GDR was 
akin to a recognition of its full and unequivocal statehood. The Hel- 
sinki CSCE framework served to strengthen this recognition.S0 The 
GDR's fear of unification - in the terms of official statements, "ag- 
gressive imperialist policies of the F R G  aiming at "annexation" - 
seems always to have provided an essential motivating factor for the 
stands the GDR took in international law. These stands consisted of 
stressing the importance of sovereignty, the duty of non-interference 
and the inviolability of frontiers - or even stronger, the legality of the 
status Through its admission to the UN the sovereignty of the 
47. DIE VERFASSUNG DER DDR PERF] (Constitution of the German Democratic Republic, 
Apr. 6, 1968, in the Version of the Law in Regard of Addition to and Amendment of the Consti- 
tution of the German Democratic Republic, Oct. 7, 1974). See DDR-GESETZE, 5. ERG.-LFG. 
1/80. A speech by the Chairman of the National Council of the GDR, Ulbricht, on December 
31, 1966, was the last instance where (re)unification was mentioned as a goal of the GDR. See 
Zuleeg, West Germany's Eastern Policy: Legal Claims and Political Realities, 3 GA. J .  INT'L & 
COMP. L. 124, 129 (1973). In the first version of its Constitution, that of October 9, 1949, the 
GDR had still tried to deny the partition of Germany in article 1: "Germany is an indivisible 
democratic republic formed by the German Lander"; the second version, of April 6, 1968, in its 
article 8, however, explicitly provided for a duty to strive for "reunification on the basis of de- 
mocracy and socialism." It was only in the third version of October 7, 1974, ie. ,  after the Basic 
Treaty had entered into force (see infm), that such claims could no longer be found. See Hess, 
Verleden, heden en twkomst van de Duitse natie, 36 INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR 253, 255-56 
(1982). 
48. Reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 466 (1967). 
49. Treaty on the Basis of Intra-German Relations, Dec. 21, 1972, FRG-GDR, 1973 
Bundesgsetzblatt [BGBI.] 421 [hereinafter Basic Treaty], reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 16 (1973). 
50. See, e.g., Howard, Helsinki Reconsidered: East- West Relations lh Years Afrer the Final 
Act, 1977 COMMONWEALTH J .  INT'L AFF. 241, 242. 
51. See, e.g., Hiinisch, Pmbleme der internationalen Stellung der DDR, 15 DEUTSCHE AUS- 
SENPOLITIK 185, 186 (1970). 
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GDR was finally accepted,52 and its fears were abated to a large 
extent. 
However, nothing in the Basic Law prevented the GDR from unit- 
ing with the FRG. And even if that had been the case, nothing would 
have prevented the GDR, after free and democratic elections, from 
changing its Basic Law,S3 severing the "alliance" with the Soviet 
Union as contained therein, if necessary, and opting for unification, in 
accordance with its right of self-determination. 
The point then is that no other State could legally have denied the 
GDR such a reversion of position, so long as no rights of third States 
were infringed. A demand for unification, though, should not have led 
to violations of general customary rules of international law, such as 
those concerning the peaceful solution of international conflicts, the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of other States, etc. For example, 
Poland could have demanded the continuing recognition of the Ger- 
man-Polish border, and as this was agreed upon between the GDR 
and Poland in 1950,54 the GDR would have been obliged to uphold 
such recognition in the unification process until it was recognized by 
the united Germany-to-be. There the legal obligations and rights of 
the GDR under international law pertaining to this situation would 
have ended. 
As to the FRG, the situation in the beginning, at least, was radi- 
cally different. The FRG claimed to be the only legal successor to the 
German Reich, thereby confirming its claim to be the only legal repre- 
sentative of the German people as a whole (which was, of course, de- 
nied by the GDR),55 although the FRG did admit that this 
representation could only partially be fulfilled because of the de facto 
situation. This legal position was embodied implicitly in the Basic 
Law of the FRG.56 For example, article 23 announced a duty to keep 
52. Even the United States, the United Kingdom and France entered into diplomatic rela- 
tions with the GDR. See Piotrowicz, supm note 16, at 618-20, 626. See also Agreed Minute on 
Negotiations Concerning the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States 
of America and the German Democratic Republic, Sept. 4, 1974, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 1436 
(1974). Only the FRG continued to deny the GDR's sovereignty. See infm. 
53. Compare DIE VERFASSUNG DER DDR [VERF.], supm note 47, art. 63(2) with id. at art. 
108. 
54. Agreement Concerning the Demarcation of the Established and Existing Polish-German 
State Frontier [Zgorzelec Agreement], July 6, 1950, Poland-GDR, art. 1, 319 U.N.T.S. 93. On 
the Oder-Neisse Line, see generally R. PIOTROWICZ, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ACT 
OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION I  EUROPE - THE HELSINKI ACT 
AND THE ODER-NEISSE LINE LEGAL REGIME 897 (1985). 
55. See Fischer, 20 Jahre Warschauer Venmg, 20 DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK 645, 655 
(1975), on the AIleinve~retungsanm~ung (the insulting claim of sole representation). 
56. GRUNDGE~ETZ [GG] preamble, arts. 16, 23, 116, 123, 140 (FRG) (entered into force 
May 23, 1849; last amended June 26, 1965); cf: Law in Regard of Questions of Nationality, Feb. 
22, 1955, reprinted in 1 SARTORIUS, Doc. No. 22, at paras. 1, 6. 
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accession of "the other parts of Germany" open, though not a duty to 
arrive at such accession - if only because that was not within the 
FRG's sole competence to decide, seen from an international legal 
point of view.57 The GDR implicitly accepted this succession of the 
FRG to the Reich, as it refused to accept any responsibility for the 
Second World War and refused to pay Wiedergutmach~ng.~~ The 
GDR's forced compensation to the Soviet Union was officially based 
on another footing, whereas the FRG did indeed pay such 
Wiedergutmachung for damages resulting from the Second World 
War. 
It should be noted here that when it called for "accession," article 
23 aimed at an absorption of the territories of the GDR either by way 
of the five former Lander or as a whole, in conformity with some im- 
plicit announcements in the preamble.59 Article 146, in contrast, defi- 
nitely pointed to a "new start." It bluntly stated that the Basic Law 
would automatically lose its validity on the day a Basic Law would be 
freely constituted by the German people. This legal lack of clarity was 
probably overlooked at the time, as the main aim of all those provi- 
sions was a political one. However, that very conclusion already dero- 
gated somewhat from any legal force and validity that could possibly 
have been invoked towards other States; if claims are implicit and 
vague, it becomes hard for other States to know in what to acquiesce 
or not to acquiesce. 
In this regard, however, it would seem that the acceptance - ini- 
tially by the three Western allies60 and later by a larger number of 
States6' - of the Basic Law and the resulting West German reserva- 
tions to all kinds of treaties,62 created some degree of estoppel for 
those States, whatever the precise ramifications. This acceptance arose 
57. See 2 GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR 67-68, 90 (I. von Miinch ed. 1975). The Federal 
Constitutional Court of the FRG interpreted the Constitution as indeed providing for such a 
duty; however, this interpretation can be of no international legal relevance by itself: see infm 
note 64. 
58. War reparations principally for physical damage, but also for moral and psychological 
damage, inflicted by Germany during World War 11. 
59. The preamble mentioned all the Girder forming the FRG by name, and then referred to 
"the other Germans, for whom involvement in the creation of the Basic Law was impossible." 
60. See, e.g., Communiqut of the New York Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Western 
Allies on the New Phase in the Relations between the Allies and the Federal Republic, Sept. 19, 
1950, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON BERLIN 1943-1963, supm note 12, at 124-25; Statement by 
the Allied High Commission in Germany on the Sovereignty of the DDR, Apr. 8, 1954, reprinted 
in id. at 169; Statement by the Three Western Foreign Ministers on the Soviet Treaty with the 
DDR, Sept. 28, 1955, reprinted in id. at 175. 
61. See Czaplinski, International Legal Aspects of Relations between the GDR and the EEC 
- A  Polish View, 22 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 69, 72-73 (1985). 
62. In essence, these reservations sought to prevent the FRG's claim to sole representation 
from being impaired by the respective treaties. 
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mainly because of another argument put forward by the FRG: that the 
GDR's government had not been chosen by way of free and demo- 
cratic elections and that, therefore, the FRG's government was the 
only legitimate representative of the German nation.'j3 The point had 
become academic, however, after the FRG itself concluded the Basic 
Treaty of 1972 with the GDR - even though afterwards the FRG 
still tried, with increasing difficulty, to uphold its claim concerning 
exclusive representation of the German pe0ple.6~ One example of this 
difficulty is the development by the Federal Constitutional Court of its 
"roof theory." This theory allowed for two States existing under the 
roof of one, which existed in law only and remained "dormant" as 
long as the political status quo did not change.65 
For the FRG, this claim had meant that it was not only entitled to 
strive for unity but was even under a duty to do so, a duty the accept- 
ance of which was considered to be incumbent upon other States and 
which should have prevented them from blocking West German 
drives for unity. However, by recognizing the GDR (insofar as they 
had not already recognized it)66 other States ceased to acquiesce in this 
claim. So for all practical purposes the FRG could no longer legally 
claim, in respect of third States, to be the sole representative of the 
German people.67 
63. See, e.g., Zuleeg, Gnmdvertmg und EWG-htokoll  uber den innerdeurschen Handel, 8 
EUROPARECHT 209, 216 (1973). 
64. It did so even in the preamble of the Basic Treaty, but it had to admit in article 4 that 
neither of the two German States could represent the other internationally, and in article 6 that 
the sovereignty of both was limited to its own Staatsgebiet (State Territory). See Basic Treaty, 
supra note 49. On March 14, 1974, a Protocol was even signed by the FRG and the GDR to 
enter into diplomatic relations. Protocol on the Exchange of Permanent Missions, Mar. 14, 
1974, GDR-FRG, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 879 (1974). On the other hand, the Federal Minister 
for Special Tasks of the FRG in a letter written on the same day of the conclusion of the Basic 
Treaty claimed that the Treaty did not prejudice the political goal of the FRG, the unification of 
Germany in free self-determination. E. ZIVIER, supra note 12, at 378. See also Judgment of May 
4, 1955, Bundesverfassungsgericht (Constitutional Court), FRG., 4 BVeffiE 157 (Saar Case); 
Judgment of July 31, 1973, Bundesverfassungsgericht, FRG, 36 BVeffiE 1 (dealing with the 
Basic Treaty); Evans, Judicial Decisions, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 132, 147 (1976). For a discussion of 
the legal problems, see 30-48 Z E ~ H R I F T  FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND OFFENTLICHES RECHT 
UND V~LKERRECHT (1970-88); 2 GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR, supra note 57, at 76-77; Wen- 
gler, Anerkennung und Umdeutung der DDR-Staatsburgerschafr in die Deutsche Staat- 
sangehorigkeit des Rechtes der Bundesrepublik als grundgesetzlich gebotene Folgerung aus dem 
Wiedervereinigungsgebot?, 32 RECHT IN OST UND WEST 145, 146 (1988); Zuleeg, supm note 47, 
at 126. 
65. See Bleckmann, German Nationality within the Meaning of the EEC Treaty, 15 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 435,436 (1978); Hobson, The European Community and East- Wesr German Rela- 
tions, 19 VA. J .  INT'L L. 45, 48 (1978); Piotrowicz, supm note 16, at 621, 622, 631. 
66. See Chernenko, The Conference in Helsinki and International Security, 11 INT'L AF- 
FAIRS, Nov. 1975, at 3, 8 (for the Soviet view). 
67. Contra Morawitz, Der innerdeutsche Handel und die EWG nach dem Grundwrtrag, 28 
EUROPA ARCHIV 353, 358 (1973) (comparing "Germany" to the "Commonwealth," but appar- 
ently forgetting that the latter consists of fully sovereign States, free to choose whether to remain 
in or secede from the Commonwealth); Zuleeg, supm note 47, at 130. 
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This being said, it remained true that as long as the FRG and the 
GDR were in agreement about (the modalities of) unification, no 
other State was legally entitled to prevent it. Both States were sover- 
eign and could, between themselves, legally agree on anything as long 
as no peremptory norms or rights of third States were violated. This 
lack of a legal right to obstruct a peaceful unification stemmed from an 
essential rule of international law - namely, the right of peoples to 
self-determination in freedom and without interference from outside,68 
including cases in which self-determination would lead to the unifica- 
tion of two States. 
The framework was set, furthermore, by the repeated pledges, 
which must be considered binding unilateral statementsY69 of peaceful 
and unaggressive behavior by both German States, which thus obliged 
them to adhere to the general rules of international law when striving 
for unification. 
To conclude, the legal situation surrounding unification, as 
sketched out with respect to the four occupying powers, would not 
have changed after having taken into account the legal rights and obli- 
gations of the Germanies toward all other States, and vice versa. 
The GDR and the FRG were both recognized as sovereign States, 
at least since the early 1970s, and nothing could have obstructed their 
unification, in regard of which they were bound only by their general 
obligations relating to the general rules of international law, including 
freedom, democracy and the inviolability of existing frontiers. This 
last point is very clear with respect to the GDR, though perhaps some- 
what less so with respect to the FRG because of its continuing claim 
to represent the entire German people. However, no other State had 
continued to acquiesce in the FRG's sole representation claim, and in 
any case, by acquiescence in the actual frontiers of Poland and the 
Soviet Union through treaties with both States,'O the Federal Republic 
was legally barred from calling those frontiers into question during the 
process of unification. Likewise, the GDR was barred by its 1950 
treaty with Poland. 
The claim that only a united Germany could definitively obligate 
itself to respect the territorial inviolability of Poland, was a legal so- 
phistication that perhaps remained true, but which could not be used 
- 
68. See, e.g., UN CHARTER arts. l(2) and 2(7). 
69. Nuclear Test Cases (Austl. v. Fr., N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 267. 
70. Warsaw Treaty, Dec. 7, 1970, Poland-FRG, 830 U.N.T.S. 327 (entered into force June 3, 
1972); Moscow Treaty, Aug. 12, 1970, FRG-USSR, 1972 BGBI. 353, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1026 
(1970) (entered into force June 3, 1972). See generally Zuleeg, supra note 47, at 140, Bymes, 
United Stores Policy towords Eartern Europe: Before and After Helsinki, 37 REV. OF POLITICS 
425, 448, 459, 460 (1975). 
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to dodge the relevant obligation. Since the two unifying States had 
each acknowledged this inviolability, they were both bound to strive 
for the same acknowledgement by a united Germany-to-be - which 
by logic could not do anything else but once and for all acknowledge 
such inviolability, the more so because otherwise Poland's rights as a 
third State would have been encroached upon. The Federal Republic 
claim that it alone could not acknowledge this on behalf of a Ger- 
many-to-be was inconsistent with its duty to publicly accept its obliga- 
tion to strive for such an acknowledgement by a united Germany 
during unification. As well, such a claim illustrated the necessity of a 
peace treaty in which this obligation could obtain its final character. 
At the least, a similar agreement was necessary because most problems 
usually dealt with in peace treaties could hardly be dealt with in the 
framework of the German unification process due to the existence of 
almost full sovereignty for both Germanies. 
IV. THE TWO GERMANIES, NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT 
Next, it remains to be determined whether the incorporation of the 
two Germanies into NATO7' and the Warsaw Pact,72 respectively, 
produced any legal ramifications concerning the unification issue by 
providing rights or duties for third States. In other words, the issue is 
whether those treaties, or the structures they created, could have le- 
gally impacted upon a possible wish of the two Germanies to unite. 
Two related aspects must be analyzed here. One question is 
whether the treaties constituting NATO and the Warsaw Pact con- 
tained express rights and/or obligations of the States parties with re- 
spect to German unification. A second question is whether the two 
Germanies could have escaped such potential obstacles by leaving the 
respective blocs. 
In this context, the two treaties constituting the two blocs are es- 
sential because the fact remains that two sovereign States by their own 
choice, and officially by their own free will, adhered to two different 
military alliances with a number of other sovereign States. This was 
certainly the case with the GDR, which became a member of the War- 
saw Pact in 1955 only after peace had been declared unilaterally by the 
Soviet Union. 
The unification problem was not expressly mentioned in the treaty 
71. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; 
Protocol on the Accession of West Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 243 U.N.T.S. 308. 
72. Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw Pact), May 14, 
1955, 219 U.N.T.S. 3 (with the GDR as an original party). As of March 31, 1991, the Warsaw 
Pact has altogether ceased to exist as a legal entity. See NRC Handelsblad, Mar. 30, 1991. 
526 Michigan Journal of International Law p o l .  12510 
constituting the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, the objectives of the 
Treaty, as mentioned in the preamble and several articles,73 seemed 
not only to avoid the obstruction of a peaceful unification, but to actu- 
ally urge parties to pursue such a unification if it would stabilize the 
security situation in Europe. The pledge the parties made to them- 
selves in the preamble, however, formed a legal protest toward "a re- 
militarized Western Germany and the integration of the latter in the 
North Atlantic Bloc." This pledge could have become a problem - if 
the GDR had applied for membership in NATO and if such member- 
ship had been seen by the Warsaw Pact States as incompatible with 
the Treaty - because article 7 obliged the parties not to adhere to any 
coalition or alliance whose aims conflicted with the aims of the Treaty. 
The GDR's position when it signed the treaty constituting the 
Warsaw Pact combined the two approaches by claiming to strive for a 
peaceful and democratic reunited Germany that was, however, to re- 
main outside military alliances in those parts of Germany that had 
been integrated before such reunification.74 All this, taken together, 
formed the legal framework of the Warsaw Pact relevant to the 
GDR's unification positioning. 
Practically speaking, withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact by the 
GDR would not have been much of a problem. The structure arising 
out of the Warsaw Pact remained, up until its demise in February and 
March 1991, an organization with perhaps d e  facto control over mili- 
tary action on the one hand, but at any rate de  jure without an inte- 
grated military system.75 The de facto control stemmed mainly from 
separate bilateral treaties between the Soviet Union and its (former) 
satellites within the Warsaw Pact system. As such, these treaties were 
renegotiable, as recent developments of course have shown. Thus, as 
to the GDR, its duty to allow Soviet troops on its territory rested 
solely on bilateral treaties and those treaties might have been re- 
nounced or renegotiated according to their terms. 
The situation concerning the Warsaw Pact treaty itself was some- 
what less clear because it did not contain a withdrawal or renunciation 
73. Id. art 1 ("refrain . . . from the threat or use of force", "international peace and security 
are not endangered"), art. 2 ("participate . . . in all international action for ensuring international 
peace and security"), art. 8 ("act in accordance with the principles of respect for each other's 
independence and sovereignty and of non-intervention in each other's domestic affairs") and art. 
1 1  ("In the event of the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe"). 
74. See Seiffert, Volkerrechtliche Aspekte der Verlangertmg des Warschauer Pakres, 28 
GERM. Y.B. INT'L L. 409, 416-17 (1985). 
75. See id. at 412-16, 420-22. It must be noted, however, that pursuant to article 5 of the 
Warsaw Pact, a "joint command" was established on the same day that the treaty was con- 
cluded. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION A D INTEGRATION, Doc. No. 1I.C.l.b (2d ed. 
1981). 
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mechanism. Lack of such a mechanism could imply, according to the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT"), that it could 
not have been renounced unless certain circumstances had been found 
to apply: namely, the parties must have intended to admit the possibil- 
ity of renunciation, or such a possibility must have been implied by the 
nature of the treaty.76 
However, the withdrawal of Albania in 1968, in accordance with 
its own national laws, did not meet with any official protest capable of 
nullifying the withdrawal, thus pointing toward acquiescence on the 
part of the other Warsaw Pact members as to the possibility of with- 
drawals, and thereby precluding them from later preventing such 
~ithdrawals.~7 From this it may be concluded that nothing legally 
could have prevented the GDR from withdrawing from the Warsaw 
Pact if its membership therein were to obstruct unification. The only 
caveats to this seemed to be the repeated statements from official GDR 
sources as to their peaceful aims and their intent to comply with inter- 
national law.78 
On the other side, the FRG was integrated into NATO shortly 
after it gained its sovereignty in 1954. The situation here, however, 
differed in several aspects from the situation concerning the GDR. 
To begin with, as mentioned above, the FRG had to allow for 
some residual occupationary rights to remain in existence, a legal dif- 
ference when compared to the GDR. When they allowed the admis- 
sion of the FRG into NATO, the three Western occupation powers 
pledged themselves to terminate the occupation regime "as soon as 
possible," but nevertheless retained "certain responsibilities incumbent 
upon them in Germany deriving from the international situation."79 
At the same time, in reaction to a common declaration by the three 
Western allies, the FRG made a unilateral declaration whereby it obli- 
gated itself never to use force "in order to obtain the reunification of 
Germany or the change of the existing borders of the FRG."80 
Likewise, on the occasion of the FRG's joining the Western Euro- 
pean Union (which was a prerequisite for joining NATO), the (bind- 
76. See Vienna Convention, supm note 4, at art. 56(1). In its comment on the draft of this 
article, the ILC expressly mentioned treaties constituting military alliances as falling within the 
scope of the second condition. 
77. Washburn, The Current Legal Status of Warsaw Pact Membership, 5 INT'L LAW. 129, 
131-33 (1971). 
78. Fischer, supm note 55 (author was the Minister of External Affairs of the GDR at the 
time). 
79. Final Act of the Conference of Nine Powers, London, Oct. 3, 1954, 31 DEP'T ST. BULL. 
515 (Oct. 1954). 
80. Id. at Annex A. 
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ing) declaration of the Chancellor of the FRG of October 23, 1954,81 
that the FRG would not make its own weapons of mass-destruction, 
would have prevented it from dodging such an obligation through uni- 
fication, and probably would even have become binding upon a united 
Germany as a successor State.82 
Finally, in a Declaration83 accepted by the three Western allies, the 
FRG obligated itself not to use force to obtain the unification of Ger- 
many or the modification of the existing borders of the FRG, and to 
solve all disputes arising between the FRG and other States by peace- 
ful means. This perhaps did not so much definitively bind Germany, 
once united, as it bound the FRG to provide guarantees during the 
unification process that the Germany-to-be would maintain the same 
position. 
For all these reasons, the fact that the NATO Treaty contained a 
clause in article 8 similar to that of article 7 of the Treaty of Friend- 
ship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, which obliged parties not 
to enter into international obligations conflicting with the NATO 
Treaty, is of much more legal relevance here than was the case with 
the GDR. 
Next, as to the withdrawal question, it is important to note that at 
the time of the FRG's admission to NATO, the integrated military 
structure of NATO was created under the unified command of the 
Supreme Allied Command, Europe ("SACEUR").84 Decisions of the 
Council of NATO can become binding on their member States by var- 
ious means, such as the development of customary law by acquies- 
cence (e.g., to actual military integration) or by estoppel based on such 
acquiescen~e.8~ This could have meant that, in contrast to the War- 
saw Pact system, reunification would not have been so easy to accorn- 
- -- - 
81. Protocol No. I11 to the Brussels Treaty, Oct. 23, 1954, 2 EUR. Y.B. 321, 323 (1956). 
Annexed to Protocol No. I11 on the Control of Armaments by virtue of article I of the Protocol. 
See 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 134 (Supp. 1955). 
82. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 22, 1978 [herein- 
after Convention on Succession]; 17 I.L.M. 1488 (1978) (not yet in force). Its articles relevanl to 
the subject are accorded a great deal of acceptance by the world's States, if not considered to 
have customary binding force. See, e.g., with regard to the "moving treaty frontiers" doctrine, 
the discussions and reports in the ILC Yearbooks from 1974 through 1978, and in particular 
[I9741 2 (1) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 174, 174-269, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/ 1974/Add.1 (Part 
1). See also Kearney, The Twenty-Sixth Session of the International Low Commission, 69 AM. J .  
INT'L. L. 591, 591-602 (1975); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AW 
665-71 (3d ed. 1979). 
83. See Final Act London supra note 79, pt. V. 
84. See Final Act London, supra note 79, pt. IV; Resolution of the Council of NATO, Ctt. 
22, 1954, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND INTEGRATION, supra note 75, Doc. 
No. II.B.2.a. 
85. See Bouter, Volkenrechtelijke binding van Nederland aan de inhoud van NAVO-besluilen, 
INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR 292 (1980). 
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plish when it would have meant inclusion of GDR territory in 
NATO's scope.86 
However, the problem would have been almost academic, because 
the North Atlantic Treaty did contain a renunciation clause in article 
13, enabling every State party after 1969 (ie., after the Treaty had 
been in force for twenty years) to renounce the Treaty on one year's 
notice. 
The only obstacles in the way of German unification to be found in 
the North Atlantic Treaty were, therefore, more or less similar to 
those found in the Warsaw Pact: the general obligation to refrain 
from the use of force and to act in accordance with the Charter of the 
United  nation^.^' In the preamble of the Treaty, the parties even sol- 
emnly stated their determination to "reaffirm their faith in the pur- 
poses and principles of the Charter of the United Nations" - which of 
course encompasses the sovereign right of States to define their own 
policies and the right to self-determination - and in article 7 explic- 
itly stated that the North Atlantic Treaty could not derogate from 
such rights under the Charter. Thus, the FRG would seem to have 
had a legal right, with some restrictions only, to leave NATO if mem- 
bership became an obstruction to unification. And as long as unifica- 
tion was in conformity with the aims of NATO as stated in the 
preamble and elsewhere, the legal obstacle of article 8 would not have 
been applicable. 
In conclusion, it must be said that if both Germanies agreed on the 
military alliance aspect of unification, neither NATO nor the Warsaw 
Pact could have legally prevented their respective members from be- 
coming part of a unified Germany. This would have remained true, of 
course, as long as unification took place within the framework of the 
principles of the UN Charter and without infringing upon the rights of 
third States, e.g., Poland, and as long as the FRG and the GDR kept 
within the bounds of the goals stated by both alliances: stability and 
security, freedom and self-determination, and a peaceful settlement of 
disputes as much as a peaceful unification. It might even be said that 
the members of both alliances, especially the members of NATO, tak- 
ing into account their repeated pledges, had at least morally commit- 
ted themselves to amve at such a unification. 
As to the second aspect considered, the Warsaw Pact could not 
have prevented a member from lawfully renouncing the Treaty consti- 
tuting it. Within NATO the situation was slightly different: renuncia- 
86. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supm note 4, at arts. 54(B), 56(l)(a). 
87. See North Atlantic Treaty, supm note 71, at art. 1. This obligation was acknowledged by 
the FRG again and again through the years, in many different situations and in many fora. 
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tion was possible, on one year's notice (at least from 1969 on), though 
there would have been de facto difficulties. The FRG furthermore had 
vowed not to make atomic weapons, a vow that could not be unilater- 
ally revoked, because it had been sustained through the years and 
thereby created an estoppel the FRG could not have dodged through 
unification. Even more important, though not provided for by the 
NATO or Western European Union treaties, is the status of the FRG 
as a "non-nuclear weapon State" pursuant to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty.ss These restraints, however, applied more to the modalitic:~ of 
unification than to unification as such. 
It would have been quite another problem, and a mainly poli iical 
one at that, whether parts of a unified Germany could have "re- 
mained" in the Warsaw Pact system or in the NATO-alliance with 
regard to the respective territories within those blocs before unifica- 
t i ~ n . * ~  Because only States can become parties to either bloc, and not 
"territories" or parts of States, new agreements or reservations would 
have been required if a unified Germany had opted for such ar. ar- 
rangement. Thus, it would have been a legal issue between NATO 
and such a Germany only, if the new Germany had opted to maintain 
or create a German membership while excluding certain German ter- 
ritories from NATO control. 
Likewise, if the GDR had refused unification because it woulc. not 
accept the severance of all ties with the Warsaw Pact as a precondition 
for such a unification, a new Germany and the Pact itself could :have 
opted for a de facto "partial" membership. And although such ,2  re- 
sult would have been practically and politically highly unrealistic, and 
in light of the FRG's solemn wish to maintain its ties with NATO 
even utopian, in law it could have been combined very well wi.th a 
NATO membership of (a part of) Germany. The only legal prercqui- 
site would have been an agreement between a unified Germany (after 
such an agreement had been reached by the two parts during un:.fica- 
tion) and the two alliances. According to its own terms (and contrary, 
of course, to actual political reality), NATO was not specifical1:y di- 
rected against the Warsaw Pact, and vice versa. Only the preamtlle of 
the Warsaw Pact as quoted earlier seems to point to legal irrecorcila- 
bility of double membership. 
In any case, the actual modalities would have depended OIL the 
form unification was to take. If a new State "Germany" were to have 
88. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1 ,  1968, 
arts. 11, 111, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 171-72 [hereinafter Non-Proliferation Treaty] (entered int) force 
Mar. 5, 1970). 
89. The same would have applied to a neutral Germany. 
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replaced the two former Germanies, then that new State would have 
had to apply for accession to either treaty anew because the conditions 
of operation of those treaties would have been radically changed in 
terms of their military and strategic contents in view of the nature of 
the NATO and Warsaw Pact treaties.% On the other hand, if the 
FRG had legally absorbed the GDR, then East German membership 
in the Warsaw Pact automatically would have ceased. For the "new" 
FRG, membership in NATO would not have ceased, though it would 
have automatically covered only the former West German territories. 
For extension to former GDR territories, the consent of the other 
NATO members would have been necessary.91 
V. THE TWO GERMANIES AND THE CSCE PROCESS 
As to the fourth context relevant to German unification, the pro- 
cess of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in only 
those aspects relevant to the German question will be highlighted. 
First it must be stated that the CSCE process, of which the Final 
Act of Helsinki, 1975, still the most prominent result as far as our 
problem here is concerned, is sui generis in international law. It is 
unique because on the one hand express legal obligations were avoided 
and reference was made to all kinds of purposes and principles, but on 
the other hand some of those principles were only applications of pre- 
existing general legal principles in a European context, and therefore 
were legally binding. 
The Final Act clearly was no treaty, at least not in the ordinary 
sense, hence no legal obligations could have been derived from it as 
such.93 That was made clear by the wording and various provisions of 
the Act, the various declarations as to its value made by participating 
90. See Convention on Succession, supra note 82, at arts. 17(3), 31(1). 
91. See Convention on Succession, supra note 82, at art. 15@) or 31(3), depending on the 
precise interpretation of the respective applications. See, e .8 ,  the discussion within the ILC, in- 
fm, at note 118. 
92. On the other hand, see von der Dunk, Challenges and Opponunities: The Eumpean Com- 
munities and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 3 LEIDEN J .  INT'L L. 247 
(1990). Further, on the CSCE in general, see Fawcett, The Helsinki Act and International Law, 
13 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 5 (1977); Doernberg, Gipfeltreffen fur den 
Frieden, 25 DEUT~CHE AUSSENPOLITIK 5 (1980); Dominick, Lo Confirence sur la SPcuritP et b 
Coop6mtion en Europe: Un Cadre pour la Solution du Conflit Est-Ouest?, 1983 REVUE DU 
MARCHB COMMUN 549; Gasteyger, Europa nvischen Helsinki und Belgmd, 32 EUROPA ARCHIV 
1 (1977); Mates, Yon Helsinki nach Madrid und zunick, 38 EUROPA RCHIV 659 (1983); Wettig, 
Die Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten auf der Belgmder KSZE-Folgekonferenz, 28 OSTEUROPARECHT 
473 (1978). 
93. It is interesting to note that the GDR claimed it to be a binding document because of the 
find recognition of the territorial status quo contained therein. See Meier, Die Auswirkungen der 
Konferenz w n  Helsinki im Gesamteumpiiischen Rahmen, 1975-76 DIE INTERNATIONALE POLI- 
TIK 91, 93-94 (1981). Poland also tried to derive "hard" international law from the CSCE in 
order to gain recognition for the finality of the Oder-Neisse line. Polish Institute of International 
532 Michigan Journal of International Law pol .  12:510 
States, and especially the provision expressly preventing registration 
under article 102 of the UN Charter with the Secretary General oj'the 
UN - a procedure specifically concerning treaties. 
On the other hand, several of the principles - such as those reaf- 
firming the right to territorial integrity, the inviolability of frontiers, 
the renunciation of force, the duty to solve disputes by peaceful means, 
the prohibition of intervention in domestic affairs and, last but not 
least, the right to self-determinationg4 - can clearly be found in other 
instruments binding upon the thirty-five "parti&' to the CSCE, rnost 
notably in the UN Charter95 and the authoritative elaboration 01' the 
aforementioned Charter principles in Resolution 2625(XXV).96 Based 
on this, the fact that the "parties" expressly wished to avoid hard and 
fast legal obligations flowing from the Act did not diminish their obli- 
gation under international law to uphold those principles. 
None of the principles mentioned above would have seemed to pre- 
vent a possible German unification as long as it were accompli,jhed 
peacefully and without violating the frontiers of other States; "vi'3lat- 
ing" means that frontiers could not be changed against the will of the 
parties concerned (even peaceful coercion is forbidden, according to 
principle VI).g7 Poland, therefore, could and can unilaterally prevent 
the Oder-Neisse frontier from being changed or renounced against its 
will. 
The frontiers, however, were not absolutely frozen. 1nviolabil:lty is 
not immutability, and if the FRG and the GDR in their sovereign use 
of their right of self-determination wished to abolish the frontier divid- 
ing them, no CSCE "party" would have been legally able to prt:vent 
this. This is in accordwith principle I of the Final Act which explic- 
itly states that "frontiers can be changed, in accordance with intcrna- 
tional law, by peaceful means and by agreement." 
Affairs, Poland and the Implementation of the CSCE Final Act, 15 STUDIES IN INT'L RELATIONS 
20-21 (1980). 
94. As contained in principles I, 11,111, IV, VI and VIII of the Final Act. Regarding the last 
principle, the crucial question becomes in what sense "self-determination," a peremptory norm of 
international law when applied in a colonial context, is to be applied in the case of t:le two 
Germanies. In view of the fact that "the Germans" are a people in almost every sense of the 
word, despite the fact that they were as a nation divided into two States (just like the two former 
Vietnams, the two Koreas), the right is applicable indeed. 
95. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 1(1), 1(2), 2(3), 2(4), 2(7). 
96. G.A. Res. 2625,25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28), at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970). This 
resolution in effect is binding because, as is shown by its approval by near unanimity, it ct~ntains 
customary law. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (N~car. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 99-102, 106, 108, 133. See also von der Dunk, supra note 92. 
97. Poland even claims this to rule out "the question of any State's frontiers," Polis11 Insti- 
tute of International Affairs, supra note 93, at 20. See Blech, Die KSZE als Schritt im Ertspan- 
nungspmzess: Bemerkungen zu allgemeinen Aspekten der Konferenz, 30 EUROPA ARCHIV 681, 
688 (1975) for the opposite point of view of the FRG. 
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This held true formally as well, precisely because of the sui generis 
character of the CSCE. Since the Act was not a treaty, the 35 signa- 
tory States were not parties to it in the legal sense and therefore could 
not legally invoke breaches of obligations and duties under it - unless 
these obligations were already binding under general international law 
and invocable in other contexts. 
The conclusion, then, must be that the CSCE system could not 
have been used to prevent German unification outside of the frame- 
work explained above, because no independent obligations derived 
from it for States "parties." The CSCE Final Act merely reiterated 
pre-existing rules of international law, thereby only providing addi- 
tional support for the framework developed above, within which unifi- 
cation was to be allowed and perhaps even aimed at. The obligation as 
to the inviolability of frontiers was perhaps the most relevant one here 
as a conditio sine qua non for unification, whereas the other principles 
- such as non-intervention in internal affairs of another State, the 
sovereign equality of States and the right to self-determination - 
were examples of principles barring interference with unification and 
effectively promoting it. 
Finally, even if some of the rules contained pre-existing obliga- 
tions, they could not have been invoked under the CSCE system, 
but only before bodies in other systems of dispute settlement - if ap- 
plicable - or they could have been put on the agenda of follow-up 
conferences. 
The new CSCE Charter, signed in Paris on November 21, 1990,98 
could, therefore, do nothing but confirm the principles of the Helsinki 
Act, such as those concerning friendly relations among participating 
States, confirm thereby inter alia German unification, and thus con- 
firm the above conclusions. The Two Plus Four Treaty thus was 
noted with great satisfaction, and German unification was sincerely 
welcomed, being "in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of 
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and in full 
accord with [its] neighbors." German unification finally was consid- 
ered as "an important contribution to a just and lasting order of peace 
for a united, democratic Europe." 
VI. THE TWO GERMANIES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
The next problem to be analyzed concerns the role of the European 
Communities in the process of German unification. The FRG had 
98. Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 190 (1991). 
Like the Helsinki Act, the Charter was "not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the 
Charter of the United Nations." 
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been a Member of the EC from the very beginning and the crucial 
question is how this could or should have legally influenced its unifica- 
tion options. 
The EC were constituted as economic cornmunitie~;~~ however, the 
ultimate goal was from conception a political community or even a 
political union.100 Despite various, and sometimes lasting, setbacks in 
the tightening of economic integration, small careful steps were taken 
in the political field as well. An informal and legally non-committing 
consultation process ensued in matters of foreign policy, a process 
which grew into the European Political Cooperation ("EPC") and fi- 
nally was given a legal basis by the Single European Act of 1986.lo1 
At the moment of German unification, the EC found themselves in 
a vastly accelerated process of reaching a true internal market by 
1992, thereby almost completing the EC in a narrow economic sense. 
Pressure towards further integration both in a broader economic 
sense, as in the plans for a European Monetary Union, and in a polit- 
ical sense, as in the EPC, intensified every day, and plans for a Euro- 
pean Political Union abounded. 
Thus, within the context of the EC as a whole, when considering 
FRG membership in the EC and possible unification, two legal factors 
had to be taken into consideration: the economic aspects of the EC's 
integration, with their basis in the EC Treaties of 1951 and 1957 (in 
their amended versions), and the political aspects, with their basis in 
chapter I11 of the Single European Act, which formally fell outside the 
EC Treaties' regime as such. 
From the perspective of the EC Treaties themselves, i.e., the inter- 
nal market, it was clear that a unification of Germany would have 
important practical consequences for the EC's economic integration 
process. This meant, keeping in mind the rebus sic stantibus rule of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,'O2 that the legal obliga- 
tions which the signatory States undertook when signing and ratifying 
the Treaties would be altered to an appreciable extent. One only 
99. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, opened for signi- 
ture Apr. 18, 1951, preamble, arts. 1, 2, 3, 126 U.N.T.S. 140, 143, 145, 147 [hereinafter ECSC 
Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for signature Mar. 25, 
1957, preamble, arts. 1, 2, 3, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 ,  14-16 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]; Treaty Establish- 
ing the European Atomic Energy Community, opened for signature Mar. 25, 1957, preamble, 
arts. 1, 2, 298 U.N.T.S. 167, 171-73 [hereinafter EAEC Treaty]. 
100. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supm note 99, at preamble (paras. 1 ,  2); Single European Act, 
Feb. 28, 1986, BULL. EC, Supp. 2/86 (1986). See also P .  KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN 
THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 21-28 (L. Gormley 
2d ed. 1989). 
101. See Single European Act, supm note 100, at art. 1 (last sentence). 
102. See supm note 10 and accompanying text. See also Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at 
art. 62, 
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needed to think of the possible impact of unification on the composi- 
tion of the European Parliament, the voting procedures in the Council 
of Ministers, the Social Fund and the regional and structural support 
system embedded in the EC,lo3 or even more basically, the inevitable 
impact on competition in certain sectors of the economy. The influ- 
ence on the West German economy of "only" hundreds of thousands 
of East Germans flocking into the FRG in the previous two years had 
already provided some idea of the influence on the Common Market's 
economy when it would have suddenly found some 16 million new 
producers and consumers within its "territories." 
Due to these and similar reasons, unanimity within the European 
Communities was considered necessary1" before a new Member State 
could be admitted - as was the case with Ireland with some 3 million 
inhabitants at the time, Greece (some 9 million) and Portugal (some 
10 million). In the actual treaties providing for admission of a State, 
elaborate transition regimes were provided to ease integration, and in 
these treaties the EC insisted on certain conditions considered 
essential. lo5 
Therefore, if the GDR had wanted to become a thirteenth Member 
of the EC, as an intermediary step to unification, the EC could have 
fixed their own terms. Apart from potential political problems regard- 
ing possible applications for accession by other formerly communist 
states or even neutral Austria,lo6 such an option never seemed realistic 
in view of the rapid pace at which German unification took place. In- 
deed, German unification preempted the possibility of GDR member- 
ship in the EC. 
The result would then seemingly have been to allow the FRG, be- 
cause it was for its own reasons running down the path leading to 
unification, instead of moving step by step, to "dodge" the formal ad- 
mission procedures by economically "annexing" the GDR and thus 
saddling the EC with a fait accompli. 
However, the question remains: would such a fait accompli have 
been admissible considering that it would have fundamentally affected 
the obligations which all signatory States had undertaken when they 
became bound by the EC Treaties? The rules regarding treaties - 
103. See EEC Treaty, supm note 99, at arts. 92(2), 92(3). 
104. EEC Treaty, supm note 99, at art. 237. See also ECSC Treaty, supra note 99, at art. 98; 
EAEC Treaty, supra note 99, at art. 205 (embedding the same provisions). 
105. See P. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supm note 100, at 17-21, 54-55. 
106. See Binswanger & Mayrzedt, Was wird aus den Neutralen bei der Enveiterung der 
EWG?, 25 EWROPA RCHIV 347 (1970); Schulz, Moskau und das Problem der Integration in 
Westeuropo, 30 EUROPA ARCHIV 383 (1975); Basler & Smettan, NATO, EWG und Spanien, 21 
DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK 1181 (1976); Wallace, Europaische Gemeinschaft grosser, aber 
Schwacher?, 31 EUROPA ARCHIV 181 (1976). 
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codified later in the VCLT - granted States the right to renounce a 
- - 
treaty and the obligations encompassed in it if circumstances sur- 
rounding its conclusion or entry into force had undergone unforeseen 
fundamental changes, provided that those circumstances constituted 
an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound and that the 
effect of the changes was to radically transform the extent of obliga- 
tions still to be performed under the treaty. lo7 Apart from the compli- 
cating factor of the EC Treaties not providing for any renunciation 
procedure (discussed infra), it appears that EC Member States could 
have threatened to leave the EC if certain demands to mitigate the 
consequences of unification would not have been met. They would 
thus have had an option other than simply swallowing such faits 
accomplis. 
At any rate, all EC Member States would have had the legal right 
to be involved in the process of determination of the modalities of Ger- 
man unification, although not to obstruct German unification since 
that was a political question not covered by the EC Treaties. This 
right could also have been based on article 5 of the EEC Treaty, en- 
compassing the duty of Member States (such as the FRG) to abstain 
from any measures (such as those achieving unification) possibly jeop- 
ardizing attainment of the objectives of the EEC Treaty (such as the 
harmonious development of economic activities, mentioned in article 
2). 
The next question arising concerns the renunciation issue. In view 
of the fact that a renunciation clause had been totally omitted from the 
Treaties,lo8 it could be concluded that the EEC Treaty (and likewise 
the ECSC and EAEC Treaties) was of such a character as to fall 
within those treaties not being prone to renunciation, in the terms of 
the VCLT.1°9 The EC system as a whole was characterized by an 
important element of independence - independence existing because 
a great measure of sovereignty had been permanently transferred from 
the individual Member States to the EC. Because this competence, 
i.e., a part df their sovereignty, now belonged to the EC in their own 
right, unilateral renunciation seemed legally out of the question. This 
might have effectively prevented the other Member States from unilat- 
erally renouncing the EC Treaties because they refused to allow Ger- 
man unification to change their obligations under the treaties, as much 
107. Vienna Convention, supm note 4, at art. 62. 
108. The ECSC Treaty only provided for a date of termination (50 years after its entry into 
force) in article 97. See von Lieris, Der EGKS- Vertrag und d m  Jahr 2002,25 EUROPARECHT 305 
(1990). The EEC and EAEC Treaties were concluded for unlimited duration. See EEC Treaty 
supra note 99, at art. 240, EAEC Treaty, supra note 99, at art. 208. 
109. See Vienna Convention, supm note 4, at arts. 56(l)(a), 56(1)(b). 
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as it legally prevented the FRG from denunciation precisely in order 
to circumvent such a refusal. Withdrawal by the FRG was also pre- 
cluded, it must be stated, by the repeated pledges of the FRG that its 
future lay with integration in the EC, as laid down for instance in 
article 7(2) of the Convention on Germany.llo 
If, however, the rebus sic stantibus clause of VCLT article 62 
would not have allowed individual Member States to renounce the EC 
Treaties (because of their supranational character not allowing renun- 
ciation)lll where essential obligations of Member States were to be 
transformed by an inclusion of the GDR in the scope of the Treaties, it 
could have meant only one thing: that the power to prevent such es- 
sential obligations from being transformed by one Member State uni- 
laterally had accrued to the EC as a whole. Therefore, unanimity in 
the Council plus consent by the Commission would have seemed 
mandatory for the transformations in question! 
This would have been analogous to the question of amendments to 
the EEC Treaty - for example, a redefinition of article 227(1)1l2 to 
include a new Germany replacing the FRG - which could only have 
been made unanimously. It would not have been proper to dodge arti- 
cle 236l l3 - or article 237 - by a mere redefinition. In addition, care 
would have been required to deal with existing agreements between 
the GDR and the EC. Revision or renunciation of those existing 
agreements would have been necessary, otherwise they would, in prin- 
ciple, automatically have remained in force.l14 At the same time, the 
EC Treaties could not extend to former GDR territories without 
unanimous agreement of the EC Members, because "application of the 
treat[ies] in respect of the entire territory of the successor State would 
[have been] incompatible with the object and purpose of the treat[ies] 
110. Supra note 15. See also Corterier, L'Europe et les Relations Est-Ouest: Pmbl$rnes Ac- 
tuels er Perspectives, 47 POLITIQUE TRANG~RE 21, 22, 29-30 (1982). 
11 1. See Bleckmann, Zur Funktion des Gewohnheitsrecht irn Europ6'ischen Gerneinschaft- 
srecht, 16 EUROPARECHT 101, 102 (1981); H. IPSEN, EUROPAISCHES GEMRINSCHAFTSRECHT 
100-Ol(1972); A. BLECKMANN, EUROPARECHT 99-100, 138 (4th ed. 1985). 
112. Article 227(1) EEC Treaty stated: "This Treaty shall apply to . . . the Federal Republic 
of Germany . . . ." 
113. This article provided for the possibility of amending the Treaty after the consultation, if 
appropriate, of the Commission, and ratification by all Member States. The provision regarding 
consultation of the Commission should be considered outdated and superseded by the factual 
developments within the Community (the Commission negotiating with possibly acceding 
States), and the changes resulting from the Single European Act, supm note 100, at arts. 8, 30(5), 
especially when read in combination with article 237 of the EEC Treaty, supm note 99 (requiring 
the assent of the European Parliament for the State accession after the entry into force of the 
Single European Act); see P. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supm note 100, at 55. 
114. See Convention on Succession, supm note 82, at arts. 4, 31(1), 31(2). Article 4 makes 
the Convention applicable to treaties constituting international organizations and treaties 
adopted within such organizations as well. 
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or would [have] radically change[d] the conditions for [their] opera- 
tion."l15 Looking back, it seems that both these conditions would 
have been fulfilled in such a case. 
If, instead, only a new' interpretation had been given to the term 
"Federal Republic of Germany,"' l6 article 155 l7 seemingly would 
have granted the European Commission the competency to control, 
accept or reject such an interpretation and its application within the 
EC. At any rate, the possible existence of binding force upon others 
arising out of a unilateral interpretation would have been subject to 
this competency. 
Such a case probably would not have come within the rule as laid 
down in article 3 l(3) of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States 
in Respect of Treaties1 l8 (although that is partly a political judgment); 
however, it then would have come within the scope of the doctrine of 
"moving treaty frontiers" as codified in article 15(b). Again, it ap- 
peared from the Treaties "that the application of the treat[ies] to that 
territory [i.e., the absorbed territory] would be incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the treat[ies] or would radically change the con- 
ditions for [their] operation," thus preventing automatic extension of 
the EC Treaties to former GDR territory. 
For the time being, then, the conclusion as to the EC Treaties and 
the economic side of German unification must be that the FRG could 
not have proceeded toward unification without the consent of the EC 
Members to all modalities of such a unification that by their nature fell 
within the scope of the treaties: free traffic of goods, services, capital 
and persons, special regimes for certain areas and various forms of 
centralized economic, trade and financial policies, to name but a few. 
Insofar as the competencies of the individual Member States over 
these issues and others had already been transferred to the EC and 
therefore could not have been invoked by individual Member States, 
logically it would have been the European Communities' organs which 
could have legally invoked such competencies to influence at least the 
modalities of German unification. 
The foregoing did not derogate from the fact that the unification as 
such, which was in essence a political decision of a Member State of 
115. Id. at arts. 4. 31(3). 
116. Le., when a new Germany would have come into existence under such a name, not 
really by a unification of two States, but by absorption of the various Liinder of the GDR. 
117. It provides that "the Commission shall: ensure that the provisions of this Treaty . . . are 
applied;" and shall "have its own power of decision . . . in the manner provided for. . . ." EEC 
Treaty, supra note 99, at art. 155. 
118. See Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, [I9741 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 176-80, 
280, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/275 and Add.1 and 2, A/CN.4/278 and Add. 1-6, A/8710/Rev.l, A/ 
CN.4/L.217/Add.10 (the discussion on this point within the ILC). 
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the EC (to be taken together with a non-Member), clearly fell outside 
the scope of the treaties. The treaties did not encompass politics in the 
normal sense of the word. 
Thus, it is time to turn to the European Political Cooperation 
("EPC"), which by its very definition encompassed all questions con- 
cerning politics. The EPC, however, as formalized in the Single Euro- 
pean Act,l19 operated outside the Treaty system, and for all practical 
purposes is merely a consultation mechanism. 
Like all Member States, the FRG had a duty under article 30(2) of 
the Single European Act to inform and consult the other Member 
States regarding questions of foreign policy of general interest (regard- 
less of whether the FRG had the right to claim that intra-German 
relations were not foreign policy) prior to taking a definitive stand. 
This held even with respect to conferences, such as the "two plus 
four" conferences, in which not all Community Members par- 
ticipated.120 
However, no binding force could have resulted from such consulta- 
tion. In the last instance each party would have remained free to take 
its own stand on certain issues - as is illustrated, for example, by the 
British stand towards sanctions against South Africa and the divergent 
stands taken by EC Members with regard to the recent Gulf War. The 
duty arising from the EPC is only one to consult, not one to accept a 
"centralized" view from the Council of Ministers or the Commission, 
whose official legal role would have been restricted here to the right to 
be present. In such a consultation, the Commission would have been 
the organ most directly defending the EC's interests, and the most the 
Commission could have done on the basis of the EPC would have been 
to persuade at least three Member States to call a ministerial meeting 
in accordance with article 30(10)(d) and then to try to formulate a 
common viewpoint on the purely political aspects concerning 
unification. 
Therefore, it seems the EPC could not have functioned as a frame- 
work for influencing in a legally binding way the FRG's policies to- 
wards unification. 
But before finally providing an answer to the question of the legal 
rights, arising out of the EC Treaties and EPC, of individual Member 
States or the EC as a whole regarding unification, another problem has 
to be analyzed: namely, the effect of the reservations made by the 
- - - - - - - - - -- 
119. See Single European Act, supra note 100, at art. 30. For its operation outside the Treaty 
system, see the distinction made in arts. 3(1) and 3(2) of the Single European Act. 
120. See id. at art. 30(7)@). 
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FRG concerning application of the EC Treaties to the German 
problem. 
The FRG had from the beginning reserved certain rights in the 
form of a Protocol1z1 and a Declara t i~n. '~~ The Declaration on the 
Definition of "German National" simply announced, with an eye to- 
ward the application of the EC Treaties, that all Germans as defined in 
the Basic Law of the FRGlZ3 were to be considered nationals of the 
FRG. This meant de facto that GDR nationals (or even inhabitants of 
the former Eastern Territories) might at any time become subject to 
the same obligations and be accorded the same rights under the EC 
Treaties as nationals of the EC Member States. In view of the relevant 
legal positions of the FRG, this declaration was a necessary corollary 
of the FRG's claim to represent the "German nation" (by representing 
"its nationals"), as long as there was no arrival at a definitive peace 
settlement.lZ4 The Declaration was accepted by the five other EC 
Members and thus was binding upon them.lZ5 
Only a small number of "Germans" from outside the FRG, how- 
ever, were actually able to use a right to acquire or enjoy a "German 
nationality," and any effect on both the FRG and the EC as a whole 
was infinitesimal. The problem this raises is that after the Basic 
Treaty of 1972, a conclusion of acquiescence by the EC Members 
would have conflicted with their recognition of the GDR as a State, 
with its concurring right of exclusive diplomatic protection of its own 
nationals. The EC resolved the conflict by confining this bestowal of 
EC rights to those GDR nationals who actually transferred their dom- 
icile to the FRG, thereby affording it only to those actually acquiring 
FRG nationality.lZ6 With this change the legal solution once more 
reflected the factual situation to everyone's satisfaction. 
The Protocol on German Internal Trade was likewise adopted 
121. The Protocol on German Internal Trade and Connected Problems, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 131, reprinted in INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE ON THE COMMON MARKET 
AND EURATOM, TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC OMMUNITY AND CON- 
NECTED DOCUMENTS 261 (1959). The protocol was adopted by the Conference concluding the 
EEC and EAEC Treaties. It was adopted on the same date as the conclusion of those Treaties. 
See Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and Euratom, Mar. 
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Final Act]. 
122. The Declaration by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Defini- 
tion of the Expression "German National," Mar. 25, 1957, reprinted in Bleckmann, supra note 
65, at 435; taken note of by the Conference concluding the EEC and EAEC Treaties on the same 
date and annexed to the Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Commu- 
nities, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 269, by the Final Act, supm note 121. 
123. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] preamble, Art. 116 (FRG). 
124. See id. at preamble, arts. 23, 116. 
125. See Bleckmann, supm note 65, at 435-36. 
126. See id. at 443-46; Czaplinski, supm note 61, at 83-85. 
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both by the FRG and by the other five signatories of the EC Treaties 
at the time, and thus could be deemed binding upon the latter. The 
Protocol stated in its first paragraph that commercial exchanges be- 
tween the two German "territories" were to be considered as internal 
trade, thereby excluding EC jurisdiction as to such trade and creating 
a sort of exception to the EC's common external economic competen- 
cies. However, the practical consequences again were very small - in 
the FRG the portion of intra-German trade seemed to be of negligible 
quantity when compared to total FRG trade, and even less of it spilled 
over into the other EC countries. Thus, the possibility that this intra- 
German trade infringed upon their legal interests, which would have 
necessitated that they react to those de facto reservations to the Trea- 
ties, was small indeed. 
Moreover, the Protocol was not exclusively one-sided, as it did not 
fully acquiesce in the FRG's rights to consider intra-German trade as 
its own business. All Member States were obliged to avoid harm to 
the Common Market's principles and each other's economies by their 
trade relations with the GDR. All Member States equally in the same 
Protocol reserved their right to take measures against possible serious 
and harmful consequences resulting from this intra-German trade.I2' 
Furthermore, they did not refrain from applying EC rules regarding 
external relations to interaction with the GDR, apparently they did 
not see the GDR as part of EC territory at all. Even the European 
Commission was granted a role, namely to be informed about agree- 
ments of Member States with the GDR, thereby potentially activating 
the Commission's powers to guard application and interpretation of 
the EC Treaties under article 169 of the EEC Treaty. Nevertheless, 
for all practical purposes neither the FRG claims arising out of the 
Protocol nor those arising out of the Declaration were challenged by 
the other five Member States during the first years of the EC. 
This all changed, however, in the early 1970s when the FRG and 
the GDR concluded the Basic Treaty. Although the FRG itself tried 
to maintain its claims of sole representation and non-acquiescence in 
the status quo, in view of its recognition of the GDR as a State in its 
own right the arguments brought forward seemed a little artificial. 
Among the States that accepted the status quo and recognized the two 
Germanies as Members of the UN were the five other EC Members of 
that time.Iz8 Later, those other EC Members were to contest dynamic 
interpretation of the Protocol with a view to 1992. They furthermore 
127. See Protocol on German Internal Trade, supro note 121, at paras. 2 and 3 (aimed at the 
FRG and the other five Member States respectively; later the latter States actually protested). 
128. See Hobson, supro note 65, at 45-46. 
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concluded their own agreements with the GDR, thereby indicating 
that they regarded the GDR as an independent third State with no 
special Community ties authorizing some sort of special treatment by 
the Communities as a wh01e.I~~ 
The Commission, representing the Communities as a whole in this 
field, seemed to hold the same position as the other EC Members, and 
included the GDR from then on in the Community regulations per- 
taining to State-trade c0untries.~30 As a matter of fact, in 1988 "diplo- 
matic relations" were entered into between the EC as an organization 
and the GDR,131 and not long before actual unification the Commis- 
sion was still negotiating a trade agreement with the GDR.132 And 
even the Supreme Court of the FRG acknowledged that the Protocol 
could have no effect outside the FRG-GDR relation - which meant 
that for all practical purposes the FRG was the sole receiver of all the 
advantages and disadvantages that intra-German trade might en- 
tail.133 Hence, there was no way the FRG could have dodged the legal 
consequences of bringing the GDR within the EC; the consent of the 
other Member States would have to have been obtained. 
The conclusion then, in the context of FRG membership in the 
EC, is clearly that the EC could not have prevented a political unifica- 
tion, since it was a political question and since the EPC, the only body 
competent to deal with such questions, could never have provided 
binding solutions. The only duty that could have been derived from 
the EPC for the FRG would have been one to consult with the other 
Members and with the Commission prior to taking stands on confer- 
ences. On the other hand, the implications of German unification 
were so far-reaching with respect to the EC and their economic regime 
that the EC, which had already obtained a considerable measure of 
129. Hobson comes to the conclusion that, acquiescence being absent, Member States may 
suspend the Protocol. Id. at 53. It must be added, however, that the Council of Ministers of the 
EC saw no reason to try to change the Protocol or renounce it. See 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 
57) 3 (1973) (where it answered a question (485/72) from the European Parliament on this ques- 
tion). For these reasons, the Protocol even found its place in the First State Treaty (see infm). 
See Protocol Declarations, May 18, 1990, see also BULLETIN (Presse- und Informationsamt der 
Bundesregierung) Nr.63/S. 544, para. 2. C j  Beise, Die DDR und die Europdische Gemeinschaft, 
45 EUROPA ARCHIV 149, 150-51 (1990). 
130. Eg., Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1765/82, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 195) 1 
(1982); see P. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supm note 100, at 803. For the GDR- 
EC relation, see also, Tomuschat, EWG und DDR: Volkerrechtliche Uberlegungen zum Sonder- 
srarus des Aussenseirers einer Wirrschafrsunion, 4 EUROPARECHT 298 (1969). See also de Puiffer- 
rat, La CEE et les Pays de L'Esr, 1984 REVUE DU MARCHI? COMMUN 25; Flaesch-Mougin, Les 
accords externes de la C.E.E., 23 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE D DROIT EUROPEBN 55 (1987). 
131. See, e.g., NCR Handelsblad Aug. 16, 1988, at 5, col. 1. 
132. See Beise, supm note 129, at 152-53 (regarding discussions in January and February 
1990); NRC Handelsblad, Mar. 13, 1990, at 5, col. 1. (on March 13, the agreement even seems 
to have been initialled). 
133. See Bleckmann. supra note 65. at 442-46. 
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independent international legal personality, had an essential right to 
shape the modalities of integrating the East German economic system 
into the West German one - an integration without which "political 
unification" would have been both meaningless and useless. The reser- 
vations the FRG made with respect to GDR trade and GDR nationals 
were no longer of relevance, since the other EC Members134 and the 
Commission had ceased to acquiesce in the FRG's claim to afford a 
special status to the GDR, let alone to acquiesce in a possible claim of 
the FRG to strive for unification without EC interference. All in all, 
the EC, through both the Commission and the Member States, includ- 
ing those nine not entitled to participate on the basis of occupationary 
rights, had a legal interest in German unification and therefore had the 
concomitant right to co-determine its modalities. 
VII. THE TWO GERMANIES AND THE TWO BERLINS 
Finally, the status of Berlin and the legal implications thereof, as 
far as they concerned the unification of Germany, should be dealt 
with. Just as Germany as a whole, after the unconditional surrender 
of 1945, was divided into three, later four, zones of occupation pend- 
ing a final settlement, so too Berlin, capital of the former Reich, was 
divided into three and later four occupation zones. 
The Berlin question took a somewhat different turn when com- 
pared to the general German question. In the first years after 1945 the 
whole of Berlin was jointly governed by an Allied Kommandatura of 
the four respective military commanders. The Cold War, however, 
soon took its toll. The introduction of currency reform in the Western 
zones of Berlin in June 1948, concurrently with such reform in the 
three zones that were to become the FRG, precipitated the Soviet 
blockade of that summer and the end of the four-power administration 
of Berlin. 
The three Western zones elected a City Government in December 
1948, in accordance with article 2(1) of the Temporary Constitution 
for Berlin of August 1946 (which had been approved by the Soviet 
Union as well), whereas the Soviet Union refused to allow for such 
elections in the Eastern zone. Thereafter, West Berlin, the result of 
the fusion of the three Western zones, was granted, and retained up 
until unification, a special status. 
It was not a Land of the FRG - despite repeated claims of the 
- - - -  - -  
134. The six States that later acceded were and are bound by the same regime, by virtue of 
articles 2 and 3 of the Act Concerning the Condition of Accession and the Adjustments to the 
Treaties, Jan. 22, 1972, 15 1.0. COMM. EUR. (NO. 1 73) 14 (1972), for Great Britain, Ireland and 
Denmark (similar measures applied for Greece, Spain and Portugal). Those states did not signifi- 
cantly differ in their attitude towards the GDR. 
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FRG to the contrary;l35 it was a "German Land" at most. The 
FRG's claims referred to were rejected not only by the Soviet Union, 
but by the three Western allies as ~ e l l . 1 3 ~  The latter did allow, in 
contrast to the former, the external representation of West Berlin by 
the FRG13' and the factual incorporation of West Berlin into West 
German society. The three powers, however, retained their rights of 
occupation in a much stronger fashion than with regard to West Ger- 
many. They retained the right not only to station troops, but also to 
prevent application of West German laws, including the Basic Law,138 
to the area of (West) Berlin. Because of this right, there was no auto- 
matic application of West German laws to Berlin; a separate Berlin 
law was necessary for each piece of domestic legislation, by way of a 
M~ntelgesetz ,~~~ usually with the same wording as the respective FRG 
law. Such a Mantelgesetz provided only for semi-automatic applica- 
tion, since the Western allies retained power to reject such application. 
Such a right would certainly have enabled the Western allies to 
prevent in law the unilateral ending by a united Germany of the occu- 
pation status aqd/or to prevent any unilateral decision by such a Ger- 
many to make West Berlin part of its capital. 
Regarding East Berlin, the situation was somewhat different. 
Again, the occupant in power here did not let go of occupationary 
rights to Berlin as easily as it relinquished those rights in its respective 
zone in Germany. Nevertheless, as much with regard to "its part" of 
Berlin as with regard to "its part" of Germany, the Soviet Union went 
135. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 23 (FRG); see also Resolution A of the City Parliament 
of Greater Berlin on the Inclusion of Berlin into the Federal Republic, June 21, 1949, reprinted in 
DOCUMENTS ON BERLIN 1943-1963, supra note 12, at 116. VERFASSUNG VON BERLIN [VvB] 
(Constitution of Berlin) (1950) arts. 1(1), l(2). See 2 GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR, supm note 
57, at 70-72. 
136. See, e.g., Letter from the Three Western Military Governors to the President of the 
Parliamentary Council Approving the Basic Law, May 12, 1949, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON 
BERLIN 1943-1963, supra note 12, at 107; Allied Kommandatura Berlin BK/O (49) 139 (1949) 
(Decisions of the Stadtverordnetenversammlung Concerning the Representation of Berlin in the 
Bundestag), reprinted in id. at 117; Allied Kommandatura Berlin BK/O (50) 75 (1950); see Wen- 
gler, Berlin-Ouest er les Communaut6s Eump6ennes, 24 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTER- 
NATIONAL 217, 219 n.5 (1978); Letter of the Allied Kommandatura of May 24, 1967, on the 
Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of January 22, 1966, May 24, 1967, reprinted in E. 
ZIVIER, supra note 12, at 305; Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 4251, 4254, T.I.A.S. No. 3425, at 
138, 331 U.N.T.S. 327, 328; Petrenkow, Uber einige volkerrechtliche Aspekte des Storus w n  West- 
Berlin, in 14 DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK 152 (1969) (Soviet view). 
137. See Allied Kommandatura Berlin BKC/L (52) 6 (1952) (Extension of International 
Treaties of the Federal Republic to Berlin), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON BERLIN 1943-1963, 
supra note 12, at 130. 
138. See BK/O (50) 75, supm note 136. 
139. See Allied Kommandatura Berlin BK/O (51) 56 (1951). as amended by BK/O (55) 10 
(1955) (Possibility of a "Mantelgesetz"), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON BERLIN 1943-1963, supm 
note 12, at 128. 
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further in ending the occupationary regime than the Western allies.la 
In November 1958, the Soviet Union declared that the London Proto- 
col of 1944, which had been the basis for the four-power occupation of 
the Berlin area, had been violated by the Western powers and there- 
fore was no longer in force.141 Thereby the exclusive Soviet power 
over East Berlin was proclaimed - although, at that time, the West- 
ern allies did not acquiesce in it. 
Then, in 1962, seven years after the GDR had become an in- 
dependent State (although recognition of the fact by Western States 
was to come ten years later still), the occupation of East Berlin was 
ended (except for some rights to station troops),142 the sovereignty 
over it transferred to the GDR, and its status as de facto capital of the 
GDR transformed into a de jure status.143 Finally in 1977, with the 
promulgation of two GDR acts and the removal of the check points 
between the GDR and East Berlin, the integration of the latter into 
the former was completed. Since then, the Soviet Union has had no 
rights pertaining to East Berlin,144 as was already the case with regard 
to the GDR. The Western powers, by not claiming jurisdiction in the 
Eastern sector as apart from their general reservations concerning the 
final status of Berlin and by seating their embassies to the GDR in 
East Berlin, acquiesced in this situation.14S 
An ending to the occupation did not occur for West Berlin, 
though, because of repeated Soviet claims to that part of the city and 
because of basic agreement to such claims by the Western occu- 
p a n t ~ . ' ~ ~  This differing status was made especially clear by the Quad- 
ripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971,14' its essential provisions 
relating to West Berlin only.148 The Soviet Union declared in article 
II(A) that civil transit through the GDR to West Berlin should en- 
counter no hindrances, in accordance with a concurrent USSR-GDR 
140. It is the irony of history that politically the situation was, of course, the other way 
around. Furthermore, for similar political reasons, namely propaganda, the legal situation was 
used as a cover thereto. This worked in fact as a legal boomerang by giving the Soviets less legal 
control over unification than the three Western allies. This forms a surprising example of the 
potential political advantages that derive from taking international law seriously and from adher- 
ing to it, both in spirit and in fact. 
141. See E. ZIVIER, supm note 12, at 34, 63. 
142. Cf I. HENDRY & M. WOOD, supm note 12, at 66-67; Zuleeg, supm note 47, at 134. 
143. DIE VERFASSUNG DER DDR [VERF] art. 1 (GDR); E. ZIVIER, supra note 12, at 40-41. 
144. Cf the Soviet point of view as quoted in E. ZIVIER, supm note 12, at 392. 
145. Id. at 88-89. 
146. J. G ~ o u x  & P. MANIN, DE EUROPESE GEMEENSCHAPPEN IN DE INTERNATIONALE 
RECHTSORDE 144 (1985). 
147. ~ u a d r i ~ a r t i t e ~ ~ r e e m e n t ,  S pt. 3, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 283, 287-88, T.I.A.S. No. 7551, at 2- 
3, 880 U.N.T.S. 115, 124-25; I. HENDRY & M. WOOD, supra note 12, at 335. 
148. See Zuleeg, supra note 47, at 134. But see E. ZIVIER, supm note 12, at 47-48, 59, 198. 
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agreement. The United States, the United Kingdom and France de- 
clared in article II(B) that the ties between West Berlin and the FRG 
would be sustained and developed further, but explicitly without al- 
lowing for constitutional integration in, and government by, the FRG. 
All four powers reserved their existing rights and obligations in article 
1(3) ("as to the whole of the area" - perhaps East as much as West 
Berlin, but if so only regarding the residual rights as to the Germany 
of 1937 (see supra)), obligated themselves to recognize the rights of the 
other three, and furthermore obligated themselves (in article I(4)) not 
to unilaterally change the existing situation. 
The admission of the FRG to the United Nations in 1973 did not 
alter the status of Berlin. The FRG again claimed Berlin to be a 
however, the occupation powers reserved their rights as to 
Berlin - both the four of them together's0 and the three Western 
- 
powers alonelS1 - and the FRG accepted those claims even up to the 
First State Treaty of July 1, 1990!lS2 
The conclusion regarding the four occupying powers, therefore, is 
that they could have prevented a united Germany from changing the 
West Berlin situation. This, of course, was a formidable political lever 
with regard to the unification of Germany as a whole. On the other 
hand, the pledges by the Western allies to "see the reunification of the 
city in free elections in order that Berlin may take its due place in a 
free and united Germany,"lS3 and similar pledges by the Soviet Union, 
may well have narrowed the framework within which they could have 
legally used this lever. This narrowing probably left them with only as 
much leverage over Berlin as they had over the general unification. As 
- 
to East Berlin, though, the residual occupationary rights that were re- 
served by the four powers in relation to the Germany of 1937 seemed 
to be too weak to have any meaningful effect, and perhaps were lost 
following the acquiescence in the sovereignty of the GDR, including 
sovereignty over its capital. 
Neither the North Atlantic Treaty nor the treaty which created the 
Warsaw Pact contained clauses relevant to the question of Berlin, 
149. Law relating to the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Charter of the 
United Nations, June 6, 1973, art. 2, reprinted in E. ZIVIER, supra note 12, at 379. 
150. Declaration on the Question of U.N. Membership for the Two Germanies, Nov. 9, 
1972, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 217, E. ZIVIER, supra note 12, at 371. 
151. Allied Kommandatura Berlin BKC/L (73) 1 (1973), reprinted in E. ZIVIER, supm note 
12, at 378. 
152. First State Treaty, supm note 2, at art. 37, states: "In compliance with the Four Powers 
Agreement of September 3, 1971, this treaty will be extended to West Berlin in accordance with 
fixed procedures." (authors' translation). 
153. Declaration on Berlin by the Three Ministers of the USA, the UK, and France, May 12, 
1950, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON BERLIN 1943-1963, supm note 12, at 118. 
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apart from those pertaining to the German question as a whole. The 
same held true for the CSCE system. It is worthwhile, however, to 
look into the relation between West Berlin and the European 
Communities. 
When the FRG signed the Treaties of Rome in 1957, it appended a 
Declaration on the Application of the Treaties to Berlin, of which the 
conference "took note." The fact that the declaration was annexed to 
the Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European 
Communities of March 25, 1957,154 and adopted in the Final Act of 
the conference, must be taken to have meant acquiescence. At the 
same time, a Joint Declaration on Berlin was adopted by the confer- 
ence. The importance of the Joint Declaration did not lie so much in 
its legal contents (in effect it contained only the wish for peaceful and 
ever closer cooperation while being aware 'of the special circum- 
stances), as in what it did not contain: namely, it did not contain a 
refutation of the FRG's claim that the Treaties of Rome were also to 
be applied in the Land Berlin. Such a refutation might have been nec- 
essary to prevent acquiescence in Berlin's status as a Land of the 
FRG. The formulation of the EEC Treaty was better chosen in this 
respect; that Treaty was to apply to the "European territories for 
whose external relations a Member State is responsible."155 
However, possible EC Member States' acquiescence to the FRG's 
claim by way of the formulation of the EEC Treaty could not alter the 
legal status of Berlin. That status derived from the occupationary re- 
gime, and could not even have been changed unilaterally by the acqui- 
escence of EC Member States (and occupationary powers) France and 
Great Britain. 
The fact of application of the EC Treaties to West Berlin did not 
create any indirect inclusion of West Berlin into the FRG, because the 
Mantelgesetz which implemented the Treaties and their regimels6 was 
consented to by the three Western allieslS7 (if not exactly by the Soviet 
Union)158 without prejudice to their rights deriving from the occupa- 
154. See supra note 122. 
155. EEC Treaty, supra note 99, at art. 227(4). 
156. See Wengler, supra note 136, at 2 18. 
157. Letter from Allied Kommandatura Berlin on the extension to Berlin of the European 
Economic Community, Nov. 18, 1957, BK/L (57) 44 (1957) reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON BER- 
LIN 1943-1963, supra note 12, at 156. 
158. E. ZIVIER, DER RECHTSSTATUS DES LANDES BERLIN 257-58 (4th ed. 1987); I. HEN- 
DRY & M. WOOD, supra note 12, at 222-23 (describing the Soviet attitude and the Allied re- 
sponse in which the Western allies refuted Soviet claims as to the illegality of the application of 
the EC Treaties by noting that this application did not touch upon questions of security or 
status). 
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tion regime.lS9 As it were, the EC Treaties applied outside the legal 
sphere of the FRG (and not through it) directly to Berlin.160 The oc- 
cupation powers had at the time allowed the FRG to represent West 
Berlin externally in the signing of treaties such as the EEC Treaty. 
Immediately after the signing, however, the area of West Berlin once 
more was to be considered as lying outside the FRG, even if it were to 
be considered for most practical purposes as lying within "EC 
territory." 
Finally, as to East Berlin, no special EC relation existed distinct 
from the relation applicable to the GDR as a whole. 
The conclusion regarding the Berlins could thus only be the fol- 
lowing: the Soviet Union could not have legally prevented the inclu- 
sion of East Berlin in a united Germany any more than it could have 
prevented East Germany from becoming included-the Soviet Union 
had, in effect, completely relinquished its occupationary rights in East 
Berlin to the GDR. The Western powers had slightly more to say 
regarding West Berlin, since they never had acquiesced in the FRG's 
attempts to make it a "normal" part of the FRG and always had re- 
served their rights as to a peace treaty. Only their repeated pledges to 
strive for a united Berlin and free elections therein restricted their 
legal competency to obstruct inclusion of Berlin as a whole in a united 
Germany. 
Because of (1) their acquiescence161 to the FRG's claims concern- 
ing West Berlin, (2) the ensuing direct application of the whole of the 
EC Treaties' regime to West Berlin, and more importantly, (3) the 
occupationary status of the city, the EC could not have disturbed a 
German decision to make West Berlin part of the capital of a united 
Germany. This is so despite the clear legal relevance such an inclusion 
has for the EC. On the other hand, East Berlin's inclusion in such a 
Berlin provided no right for the EC distinct from their rights in rela- 
tion to the GDR as a third State. 
VIII. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS: ONE GERMANY! 
In answering the question as to the relevant international legal ar- 
guments and parameters controlling the unification of Germany - 
159. See genemlly Jahn, Die Eumpri'irche Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und Berlin, 7 
EUROPARECHT 232, 250 (1972) (regarding security questions and the status of Berlin as a 
whole). 
160. See I. HENRY & M. WOOD, supm note 12, at 218-20; Jahn, supm note 159, at 247. 
161. If the EC are not yet enjoying such international legal personality as to be able to "ac- 
quiesce" (or "not acquiesce"), such a possibility then is at least open to every Member State 
based on their actions within EC bodies, such as the Council; thus, the conclusion on this point 
would not change. 
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which finally took place on October 3, 1990 - the following conclu- 
sions can be drawn from the foregoing discussion. 
Within the framework of the obligations of peaceful action, respect 
for other States' sovereignty and frontiers, and other relevant rules of 
international law, no other State seemed to have been legally able to 
prevent German unification. Even the four former occupationary 
powers seemed to have been obliged to grant unification, so long as it 
was arrived at democratically and so long as a peace treaty or similar 
document, guaranteeing the status quo, e.g., in regard to the Oder- 
Neisse frontier, would ensue (or perhaps even without such a peace 
treaty becoming a fact). Only the EC seemed to have had essential 
competence to co-define the modalities and effects of such a 
unification. 
Such was the legal framework that existed at the moment when 
German unification began to be a real, political issue. It began to be 
such an issue in November 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down, 
the Honecker regime followed suit, and thorough and far-reaching re- 
forms were promised - when, in the FRG, Chancellor Kohl proposed 
his short-lived ten points plan, as a step-by-step approach with the 
potential to lead to a unified Germany after a number of years. 
It is submitted that the actual path to German unification adhered 
to in the year that followed the peaceful "revolution" in the GDR has 
kept itself within this legal framework, and more often than not has 
even been guided by it. A few well-chosen examples, concerning the 
crucial and central issues, will be sufficient proof in this respect. 
For the reasons explained above, German unification, as far as it 
concerned the two Germanies only, was hardly legally interfered with 
by third States, and was allowed to be implemented by way of the two 
Sta~tsvertrage.~~~ Of course, in those State treaties neither partners 
were allowed to violate rules ofjus cogens; it is assumed as self-evident 
that no such norms were violated. Of more relevance here is the gen- 
eral international legal rule that required that the rights of third States 
not be violated or encroached upon by unification. It was here of 
course where international law provided the relevant framework. 
The framework did not preclude one or more ways of German uni- 
fication as such: the choice of Berlin as a capital,163 for instance, was, 
once the last remnants of the occupation regime had been cleared 
away, an entirely German matter. The use of those occupationary 
rights to prevent or influence such decisions within the framework 
would not have been allowed legally and therefore would have been 
162. See supm notes 2-3. 
163. Second State Treaty, supm note 3, at art. 2(1). 
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highly hazardous in political terms. Thus, the Allied Kommandatura 
finished its work in Berlin on October 2, one day before the actual 
unification took place. 
Likewise, the Second State Treaty's provision for the joining of the 
five Lander formerly composing the GDR plus East Berlin, in accord- 
ance with article 23 of the FXG's constitution,164 resulted from the 
free choice of the FRG and the GDR. The rather sharp disapproval 
of the use of article 23 voiced by the Soviet Union at the start of the 
"two plus four" talks165 therefore had no legal basis, and consequently 
was later omitted. Thus, the choice by the Germanies to unite via 
article 23 rather than article 146 - article 146 having long been seen 
as an alternative road to unification166 - was fully within their power 
in light of the framework. 
Once their choice for the article 23 option was established, certain 
binding international legal effects existed distinct from those that 
would have obtained if a new subject of international law had been 
created.'67 As was shown, it was here that the rules of the Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, in as far as 
they were a codification of customary law, became relevant. It meant, 
for instance, that all treaties to which the FRG was a party remained 
in force and automatically entered into force for the newly acquired 
territories, with the exception of special cases such as NATO and the 
EC. 
Hence, the Soviet Union never had a legal lever to prevent the new 
164. Id. at art. 1(1), l(2). 
165. Declaration of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mar. 14, 1990, reprinted in 45 
EUROPA ARCHIV D492, D493 (1990). 
166. Choosing article 23 ensured that legally the new Germany would simply be an enlarged 
FRG, not a successor State to the two disappeared States. 
167. Of course, this was one of the reasons for choosing the article 23 option instead of 
article 146. The almost unchanged "survival" of article 146 (compare article 4(6) of the Second 
State Treaty, supm note 3) keeps open the option to later create a real successor State, Germany. 
Cf: Second State Treaty, supm note 3, at art. 5. Realization of the possibility of article 146, 
however, does not automatically lead to creation of a new State, a new subject of international 
law. See, e.g., Frowein, Rechtliche h b l e m e  der Einigung Deutschlands, 45 EUROPA ARCHIV 
233, 234-35 (1990); Klein, An der Schwelle zur Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands, 43 NEUE JURIS- 
TISCHE WOCHENXHRIIT [NJW] 1065, 1072 (1990). Contm Grabitz & von Bogdandy, Deutsche 
Einheit und Eutwpci'irche Integmtion, 43 NJW 1073, 1077 (1990). It should be stated, moreover, 
that whatever treaties would automatically cease to apply in that case, those duties contained in 
them which exist independently will remain in force as customary law. Likewise, principles of 
good faith and estoppel, and those concerning the rights of third States in general, will legally 
prevent such a new Germany from dodging obligations undertaken solely by means of treaties, as 
long as not all other parties to those treaties respectively agree. 
168. This was acknowledged by article 11 and annex I of the Second State Treaty with re- 
spect to NATO. The new State's relation with the EC is considered infm. Relations with other 
States are covered under article 12, which provides for a case-bycase approach with regard to 
treaties to which the GDR was a party, and allows for the EC to intervene if within their 
competence. 
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Germany from remaining in NATO, nor did it have any legal power 
to prevent the extension of NATO to the former GDR territory. The 
Soviet Union had only one tool at its disposal to influence such a re- 
sult: political leverage. And the Soviets used that leverage to extract 
commitments from the FRG for money and to allow Soviet troops to 
stay in the former GDR for several more years, while keeping more 
than a symbolic number of German troops 
As to the EC, in principle the relevant treaties also applied to the 
newly acquired territories after October 3. However, the European 
Communities, meaning the combination of the European Commission 
and the twelve Member States, had the sole power to determine 
whether the GDR would automatically become "EC territory" or 
would instead be subject to a transitional regime - hence the early 
announcement in March 1990 by President Delors of the Commission 
that two o5cials of the Commission would be present at all negotia- 
tions concerning unification. Delors made clear that this presence was 
to prevent the legal interests of the EC from being harmed without 
their concurrence. 170 
Thus, the two Germanies took care of those concerns of the Com- 
munities in their First State Treatyl71 and the Common Protocol172 by 
obligating the GDR to accommodate step-by-step the EC Treaties' re- 
gime and aims.173 Further, the Protocol declarations of May 18174 
provided for reciprocal and non-discriminatory treatment of EC Mem- 
ber States' nationals and companies in the territories of the former 
GDR. The Protocol on Intra-German Trade, however, remained un- 
affected under the First State Treaty.175 
Likewise, in the Second State Treaty, the EC's competencies were 
reiterated time and again;l76 and in general, the provisions of the First 
State Treaty remained app1i~able.l~~ Furthermore, article 29(2) ex- 
plicitly provided that with respect to foreign trade issues, the FRG 
169. See infm note 205 and accompanying text. 
170. NRC Handelsblad, Mar. 31, 1990, at 5, col. 8. 
171. First State Treaty, supm note 2, at arts. 1 l(3) and 13(3). These Principles are binding in 
accordance with article 4(1) of the First State Treaty. 
172. See. esp., General Principle One, Common Protocol of Oct. 3, 1990, BULLETIN (Presse- 
und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung) Nr. 63B.526 (1990). 
173. See First State Treaty, supm note 2, at arts. 15(1), 26(3) and 3q1) (on customs tariffs). 
Article 35, moreover, states that international treaties in force, whether for the FRG or for the 
GDR, will remain unaffected. 
174. B U L L E ~ N  (Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung) Nr. 63/S.544 (1990), at 
point 2. 
175. However, the uniting which occurred under the Second State Treaty made the Protocol 
without object, thereby withdrawing it. See Second State Treaty, supm note 3, at art 40(1). 
176. See, e.g., id. at arts. 9(1), 9(2), 12(1), 12(2), 12(3), 28(1) and 29(1). 
177. Cf: id. at art. 40(1). 
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and the EC were to agree to temporary exception-clauses regarding 
the GDR in its relation to its former co-members of the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance ("COMECON). 
More importantly, article 10 provided for the application not only 
of primary EC law - ie., the Treaties of Paris and Rome and the 
additional treaties and agreements such as the Single European Act - 
but also secondary EC law178 - Le., the whole legal structure built 
upon those treaties, including regulations and directives. This appli- 
cation of secondary EC law, though, was subjected to the caveat that 
the competent EC organs could provide "exceptional regulations" as 
necessary, where such exceptional regulations are intended to "reckon 
with governmental requirements and serve to avoid economic difficul- 
ties."179 This general clause clearly takes care of all remaining EC 
competence over the economic consequences of unification. 
Apart from NATO and the EC, however, the doctrine of moving 
treaty frontiers applied in accordance with customary law on State 
succession. 180 For example, the FRG's membership in the United Na- 
tions now covered former GDR territory as well, substituting for the 
latter's membership as of October 3, 1990. Likewise, following unili- 
cation the FRG obligations emanating from the CSCE process were 
extended to include the five new Lander and East Berlin. 
Apart from the rights emanating from treaties, customary obliga- 
tion existed not to violate or encroach upon the rights of third States. 
As argued above, however, that duty remained limited to a few general 
obligations codified in the framework of the UN and the CSCE. The 
most important problems here concerned the Polish border and the 
military power of Germany itself. 
The right of Poland to a guaranteed western border along the fa- 
mous Oder-Neisse line did not arise from the occupation of Germany, 
as might have seemed the case at first view. Poland was not one of the 
victors over Germany in a legal sense, since Germany had surrendered 
unconditionally as a State to the four allied powers only. Thus, Po- 
land's legal rights to the former German Eastern Territories depended 
on subrogation by the Soviet Union, which was one of the victors, and 
it was only logical that Poland was refused a seat at the "two plus 
four" conferences.'81 Also logical in the result is the fact that the So- 
viet Union exerted the most pressure on the Germanies to acknowl- 
178. Id. at art. 10(2). 
179. Id. (translation from German by F.G. von der Dunk). 
180. As codified in the Convention on Succession, supm note 82. 
181. The last preambular paragraph of the Second State Treaty, drawing attention to the five 
meetings of the "two plus four," only mentioned that the fourth meeting was "with participation 
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland." See Frowein, supm note 167, at 236. 
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edge the Oder-Neisse line,lg2 since it was the most concerned of the 
four with the Eastern border of Germany and the territorial security 
of its (former) ally Poland. 
This, however, did not mean that Poland had no sovereign rights 
of its own to the former Eastern Territories. Rather, as seen before, it 
had rights stemming from acquiescence, by the whole international 
community after 1970/1973, and the resultant estoppel. 
Those legal obligations were duly taken care of, to begin with, in 
the Second State Treaty. With certain reservations, this Treaty made 
the Constitution of the old FRG applicable to the whole territory of 
the new FRG,lg3 and article 4 thereof stressed that the preamble of the 
Constitution was thereby changed to the effect that the German people 
had thus granted themselves this Constitution. The article reads: 
"[We hereby] have in free self-determination completed the unity and 
freedom of Germany. Thereby this Constitution applies for the whole 
of the German people." This meant that the (united) FRG no longer 
maintained any claim to the former Eastern Temtories. 
This conclusion was confirmed by the Soviet-German treaty of 
September 18, 1990, lg4 which specifically prohibited any pressure for 
changes of European borders,185 including of course pressure by mili- 
tary means. Moreover, that treaty referred to more general interna- 
tional legal obligations and the CSCE agreements.lg6 Thus, to the 
degree that international law affects politics, Poland can now rest as- 
sured of its western border. 
In this light, the German-Polish treatylg7 was no more than an- 
other legal reiteration and seal to an already existing German obliga- 
tion.188 Thus, not even a refusal by the new Germany to sign such a 
treaty would have negated the conclusion as to the sanctity of the 
border. 
182. For the resultant recognition, see the German-Soviet treaty of September 18, supm note 
5, at arts. 1-3 (especially art. 2). 
183. Second State Treaty, supm note 3, at art. 3. 
184. Treaty on Good Neighborly Relations, Partnership and Cooperation, supra note 5. 
185. Id. at arts. 2-3. 
186. Id. at arts. 1, 5 and 21. 
187. Treaty on Boundaries and Friendly Relations, supra note 6 (of which article 1 con- 
finned the GDR-Poland border agreement of 1950 and confirmed Polish possession of the former 
Eastern Territories). 
188. This can be deduced also from numerous official statements made by both the FRG and 
the GDR governments, both before and after unification. See, e.g., Foreign Minister Genscher of 
the FRG, on Sept. 21, 1990, BULLETIN (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung) Nr. 
113/S. 1187 (1990); Prime Minister de Maiziere of the GDR, on Oct. 2, 1990, BULLETIN, 
(Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung) Nr. 118/S. 1226 (1990); Chancellor Kohl of 
the FRG, on Oct. 3, 1990, BULLETIN (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung) Nr. 
118/S. 1227 (1990). 
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A similar conclusion can be drawn regarding the question of mili- 
tary power. General German obligations towards the peaceful resolu- 
tion of conflicts, the refraining from the use of violence, the respect for 
other States' territorial integrity, and the like, have been included in 
the UN Charter, the CSCE Final Act, the North Atlantic Treaty and 
the Warsaw Pact treaties. Furthermore, specific treaty obligations ap- 
ply requiring the German State to refrain from the development of 
atomic, bacteriological and chemical weapons - such as those obliga- 
tions contained in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.lB9 Apart from those 
treaty obligations applicable to the FRG, there were other obligations 
which arose from customary rules, such as those incorporated into the 
CSCE Final Act.lg0 
The Second State Treaty191 in its preamble and article 4 reiterated 
those principles, as did the First State Treaty in its preamble. Like- 
wise, in its recent treaty with the Soviet Union the new FRG has re- 
peated those pledges in general ways.lg2 Article 11 of the Second State 
Treaty, applying the "moving treaty frontiers" rule to the FRG, was 
once more an official legal seal to the application of customary and 
conventional law to the united Germany. 
Apart from this legal framework, there were no more legal param- 
eters regarding the intra-German aspects of unification; the other ele- 
ments, contained, for instance, in the Second State Treaty, are simply 
not relevant from an international legal point of view. 
All that remains to be analyzed then is the political outcome in the 
legal context of the former occupation powers. This essentially was 
the question of a peace treaty or some kind of substitution thereto - 
aside from the questions of military power and weapons of mass-de- 
struction as dealt with before - and it was to be dealt with in the 
framework of the "two plus four" conferences, which ultimately re- 
sulted in the Two Plus Four Treaty.l93 
In its preamble, the Two Plus Four Treaty pointed to the UN and 
the CSCE as providing the relevant principles for German unification. 
Furthermore, the preamble made clear that the Two Plus Four Treaty 
in essence was the substitute of an official peace treaty: It was con- 
cluded "in the consciousness that their peoples had lived in peace with 
each other since 1945,"194 "mindful of the rights and duties of the 
189. Supra note 88. 
190. Supra note 1 l and Section V. 
191. Supra note 3. 
192. Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations, Partnership and Cooperation, supra note 5, at 
arts. 1-5. 
193. Supra note 4. 
194. Id. at first preambular para. (translation from German by F.G. von der Dunk). 
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Four Powers with respect to Berlin and Germany as a whole and the 
corresponding agreements and decisions of the Four Powers from the 
times of the war and after,"195 "in the conviction that the unification 
of Germany as a State with irrevocable borders is an important contri- 
bution to peace and stability in Europe,"196 "with the goal of agreeing 
on a final settlement regarding Germany,"197 and "in recognition of 
the fact that by and with the unification of Germany as a democratic 
and peace-loving State the rights and duties of the Four Powers with 
respect to Berlin and Germany as a whole lose their importance."198 
Article 1 then confumed German unification, encompassing the 
territory of the FRG, the GDR and both parts of Berlin. Paragraph 1 
provided for the finality of those borders from the day the Treaty en- 
tered into force;199 paragraph 2 obligated Germany to specifically con- 
firm the Oder-Neisse border by way of a treaty with Poland; 
paragraph 3 reiterated the territorial finality;2oo and paragraph 4 con- 
firmed this once more by obligating the FRG and the GDR to ensure 
that no contrary provisions would be contained in the Constitution of 
the unified Germany. 
All this is, to an astonishing extent, in conformity with the legal 
framework as it existed, and therefore the above-mentioned 
paragraphs form an official legal seal, recognizing the territorial integ- 
rity of other States and their invioble borders. In the final paragraph 
of article 1 the Four Powers declared that with the fulfillment of the 
various obligations undertaken by the FRG and the GDR, the final 
character of the borders would be confirmed.201 
Article 2 of the Two Plus Four Treaty harked back to the German 
State's general obligation of peacefulness, the prohibition to start a 
war of aggression and the prohibition on the use of weapons in cases 
other than those sanctioned by the UN Charter framework. Thus, it is 
clear that care was taken to properly deal with general customary law 
obligations, such as those codified in the CSCE Final Act. 
Article 3 repeatedZoZ the obligation not to produce atomic, biologi- 
195. Id. at third preambular para. 
196. Id. at eleventh preambular para. 
197. Id. at twelfth preambular para. 
198. Id. at thirteenth preambular para. 
199. Entry into force occurred after the 5th ratification. See Two Plus Four Treaty, supm 
note 4, at art. 9 and discussion therein. 
200. Specifically, it states: "The unified Germany has no territorial claims against other 
States whatsoever and will not lodge such claims in the future." 
201. Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 4, at art. l(5). See olso Frowein, supra note 167, at 
235-36. 
202. It was originally contained in the 1954 Protocol No. 111 between the FRG and the three 
Western allies. See supra note 81. 
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cal or chemical weapons. In addition, it prohibited ownership of such 
weapons and declared the obligation of the unified Germany to adhere 
to those obligations.203 Specific mention was also made of the Non- 
proliferation Treaty of 1968,204 which in accordance with the moving 
treaty frontiers doctrine now applies to the whole of Germany. 
Paragraph 2 of article 3 served to diminish fears of a remilitarizing 
Germany by providing that within three or four years the unified Ger- 
many would have a maximum of 370,000 men under arms, with a sub- 
ceiling of 345,000 for army and air-force taken together. The Germa- 
nies were satisfied with the return promise they received from the 
other treaty partners to contribute to further disarmament measures in 
Europe. 
The harvest reaped by the Soviets from their political leverage is 
found in article 4 and article S(1). Article 4 provides that the depar- 
ture of Soviet forces from former GDR territory will be dealt with in a 
treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union.205 And article 5(1) 
provides that only local German troops (that is, those not falling 
under an integrated NATO command) may be stationed on former 
GDR territory until the Soviet troops have completely departed in ac- 
cordance with article 4. Likewise, for the same period of time, article 
5(2) allows the three Western allies to keep some forces in (West) 
Berlin. 
Finally, the central remaining issue concerning NATO member- 
ship was dealt with and solved in conformity with the legal framework 
developed above. Namely, article 5(3) stated: "After the completed 
departure of Soviet forces . . . in this part of Germany German forces 
can become stationed, which were subordinated to military alliance 
structures in the same way as those in the remaining parts of German 
territory, albeit without nuclear capability." Article 6 then added: 
"The right of the unified Germany, to belong to alliances with all 
rights and obligations arising therefrom, remains unaffected by this 
Treaty." In other words, Germany had complete freedom to continue 
to be a member of NATO; however, any integration of former GDR 
territory into the alliance's structure was to be arrived at only after an 
intermediary period, and more importantly, after the "denucleariza- 
tion" of the former East Germany. 
Next, article 7 was crucial, taken together with the preamble, in 
substituting this treaty for a formal peace treaty. In this article, the 
Four Powers terminate their "rights and responsibilities in respect of 
203. Two Plus Four Treaty, supm note 4, at art. 3(1). 
204. Non-proliferation Treaty, supm note 88. 
205. This means that Soviet forces may stay, as long as no such treaty is concludedl 
Spring 1991] German Unification and International Law 557 
Berlin and Germany as a whole," - terminating thereby also all 
agreements, decisions and practices in this regard.206 Thus, "the uni- 
fied Germany has thereby full sovereignty over its internal and exter- 
nal 
Regarding the entry into force of the Two Plus Four Treaty, article 
8(1) provided that the united Germany would ratify the treaty, and 
article 9 provided that the fifth ratification would bring the treaty into 
force. This makes clear that no one, not even the four former victors, 
could have legally obstructed the unification of Germany. Upon unifi- 
cation, and only upon unification, did the issue of a peace treaty or 
similar document again arise, along with the revival of the certain re- 
lated rights of the four powers, to be "emptied" however by the Two 
Plus Four Treaty. But even if this Treaty had never entered into force, 
the core of the rights and obligations contained therein would still 
stand because they are based on other treaties or rules of customary 
law. 
The unification could therefore only have been confronted within 
certain legal parameters, as discussed above. All those parameters 
were duly taken into consideration because they reflected the basic 
political parameters to a great extent. Most of them were reiterated, 
codified and made more express in the legal documents effecting unifi- 
cation, notably the two State, Treaties and the Two Plus Four Treaty. 
It is our final conclusion that the unification has been, so far, an excel- 
lent example of how international law has defined certain political is- 
sues and thereby influenced the relevant political developments to a 
considerable extent. At least the unification of Deutschland was not 
arrived at ~ b e r  Alles - this to the benefit not only of Deutschland 
Einig Vaterland and all other States concerned, but also of interna- 
tional law in general. 
206. Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 4, at art. 7(1). 
207. Id. at art. 7(2). 
